Cartoon Democracy: Ethiopia’s 2010 Election
Originally appeared in the International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2010-2011), pp. 27-51
The May 2010 parliamentary election in Ethiopia was a meaningless exercise in political futility. The ruling party ” won ” 99.6 percent of the seats. The final election report of the 2010 European Union Election Observer Mission to Ethiopia (EU EOM) concluded “the electoral process fell short of international commitments for elections} notably regarding the transparency of the process and the lack of a level playing field for all contesting parties.” Meles Zenawi described that report as ” trash that deserves to be thrown in the garbage When the ruling party wins all but two legislative seats, it is ludicrous to talk about a free and fair election, a functional parliament or a loyal opposition. Free and fair elections minimally require freedom of speech for candidates and political parties, a free press and free civic society institutions to disseminate and communicate with the electorate, the freedom to assemble for political rallies and campaigns, an impartial system of conducting and verifying elections and an independent adjudicatory system to resolve election disputes. These preconditions were conspicuously absent in the May 2010 elections.
The important point in the election process is not the result of the election. It is not about which party won the election. … I believe that the people of Ethiopia, beyond recognizing the efforts of the EPRDF and voting it into power have unequivocally sent a clear message to the opposition parties in our country…
Meles Zenawi, “Victory” Speech, May 25, 2010
Electing a Dictatorship
On November 15, 2010, Meles Zenawi ripped the final election report of the 2010 European Union Election Observer Mission to Ethiopia (EU EOM) as “trash that deserves to be thrown in the garbage” 1 . He bitterly complained:
“The report is not about our election. It is just the view of some Western neo- liberals who are unhappy about the strength of the ruling party. Anybody who has paper and ink can scribble whatever they want.” Five years earlier, Zenawi had slammed the final election report of the 2005 EU EOM report the same way: “The [EU] statement, in my view, shows that the [EU] mission has turned out to be something worse than a farce… We shall, in the coming days and weeks, see what we can do to expose the pack of lies and innuendoes that characterize the garbage in this report. “2
It is baffling why Zenawi would use such extreme and distasteful language to describe the months of laborious monitoring work done by scores of dedicated and experienced EU EOM professionals. Thijs Berman, the chief of the EU EOM was quick to respond: “One-hundred and seventy independent observers have been working here in Ethiopia to assess the electoral process in a very serious and professional way. Anyone who tries to show contempt for this professional work shows contempt for himself. It is degrading for the prime minister to react this way.”3 Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission applauded the EU EOM “for their excellent work and commitment” in monitoring the Ethiopian election.4
The 2010 EU EOM final election report on Ethiopia is a diplomatically-worded document supported by evidence of actual field observations5. The report made a number of important conclusions that reflected favorably on the regime and the way the elections were held and organized. The report approvingly noted that the elections proceeded in a “generally peaceful and orderly manner, with a high voter turnout.” The “Constitution, Electoral Law and other election-related regulations protect political and civil rights and allow for genuine elections, as well as the freedoms of association, assembly, movement and expression. . . The legal framework provided an adequate basis for the conduct of genuine elections in line with international and regional commitments subscribed to by Ethiopia.” The election board was commended for “administering] the elections in a competent and professional manner given its limited resources [and] overcoming significant technical challenges.”
There was no evidence that candidates were discriminated against, and “candidate registration was carried out in an adequate manner.” The report complemented the media for covering campaign events in a “neutral tone”, although “state-owned media failed to ensure a balanced coverage, giving the ruling party more than 50% of its total coverage in both print and broadcast media.” The electoral complaint procedures, according to the report, “were significantly strengthened in the last five years.”
The report also pointed out “some shortcomings” in the “training of polling station staff and in the consistency and coherence of technical information received and aggregated by the electoral authority, such as complete polling station lists, which affected the overall transparency of the process.” It found that the “freedoms of assembly, of expression and of movement were not consistently respected throughout the country during the campaign period, generally to the detriment of opposition parties.” The “separation between the ruling party and the public administration was blurred at the local level in many parts of the country.” The Report documented “direct observations” of “cases of misuse of state resources in the ruling party’s campaign activities.”
Other observations indicated that in “27% of cases observed, polling station results were different to those previously recorded by observers at polling stations. In several cases, incomplete or incorrect forms from polling stations were corrected or completed at constituency electoral offices. The transparency of the process was considered unsatisfactory in 40% of observed cases.” The ruling party and its partner parties won 544 of the 547 parliamentary seats and 1,900 of the 1,904 seats in the State Councils. Overall, the EU EOM report concluded that “the electoral process fell short of international commitments for elections, notably regarding the transparency of the process and the lack of a level playing field for all contesting parties.”
The 70-person African Union Observer Mission (AUOM) led by former Botswana president Ketumile Masire was the only other elections observation mission allowed by the ruling regime to operate in the country6. Other diplomatic missions and international organizations were officially prohibited from observing the elections even informally. The AUOM concluded, “The Ethiopian Legislative Elections were organised and conducted in accordance with the constitutional and legal provisions and the rules and regulations governing the conduct of elections in the country and were largely consistent with AU guidelines and standards for the conduct of democratic elections…. It is recognized that 2010 Ethiopia’s Legislative Elections reflected the will of the people.”7
The AUOM report was disappointing as it was embarrassing. Its observations were at best cursory. Most notably, it failed to follow the required observation standards and guidelines set forth in the AU Elections Observation and Monitoring Guidelines.8 For instance, Section III 9 (e) of the guidelines (‘Mandates, Rights and Obligations of the Observers’) required the AUOM to “observe the political parties and groups as well as the population at large in the exercise of their political rights, and the conditions in which such rights are to be exercised.” Masire by his own admission made no such
“The AU were unable to observe the pre-election period”. Under Section V (13), the guidelines mandate that “AU Observers should ascertain that: …(b) all competing political parties have equal access to both the print and the electronic media (radio, T.V.).” Masire said his team “had no way of verifying’ pre-election complaints, including complaints of unequal access to state-controlled media”. Under Section V (B) (d), the AUOM had a mandatory duty to ascertain “the campaign process is conducted in conditions of serenity, and that there are no acts of provocation or intimidation capable of compromising”. Masire’s team failed to make such inquiries. Under Section B (24), the guidelines mandate: “The atmosphere during the campaign should be carefully observed, and among the factors to consider in this regard include … (iv) persistent or reported cases of human rights violations.” Masire’s team did not appear to be even aware of such a requirement, let alone make the actual observations. It is incomprehensible how the AUOM could declare the elections “were largely consistent with African Union regulations and standards” based on mere cursory observations.
The Run-up to the May 2010 Election
In the run up to the May 2010 elections, with the exception of the ruling regime, few others had confidence the election would meet international commitments for free and fair elections. The alarm was sounded months ahead of the elections when the former president of Ethiopia, Dr. Negasso Gidada’s issued a report on his visit to Dembi Dolio in Qelem Wallaga Zone of Oromia Region in Western Ethiopia10. Based on his experiences and observations, Dr. Negasso claimed that there is “no level playing field” for the forthcoming election in Dembi Dolio, and by implication anywhere else in Ethiopia, to have a free and fair election in May 2010. His personal account evoked the farcical theatricality of a low budget political horror film: The former president shows up for a visit in Dembi Dolio and is promptly shooed away and stonewalled by local state/ruling party functionaries. He is told he cannot hold mass public meetings or engage in other forms of discussion or dialogue with the public. In disbelief, he hastily arranges individual meetings with local businessmen, community elders, teachers, health workers, church leaders, kebele (sub-district) officials, private professionals, university students, NGO employees and members and supporters of the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM). He is horrified to learn that any individual who met or spoke with him could be abused and victimized by local security operatives. He soon becomes aware of the ubiquitous and omnipotent local security apparatus with tentacles planted firmly into individual households.
Dr. Negasso’s account on the “current situation” in Dembi Dolio was downright chilling. He depicted a local party organization nestled within an oppressive security apparatus consisting of layered and operationally interlocking committees (which could be best described as “commissariats”), mimicking Stalin’s NKVD (Peoples Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in the 1930s. Households, hamlets, villages, districts, towns and zones are hierarchically integrated into a commissariat for the single purpose of coordinating command and control over perceived “enemies of the people”.
There is a vast network of informants, agents and secret police-type operatives who rely on heavy-handed methods to harass, intimidate, gather intelligence and penetrate opposition elements with the aim of neutralizing them. The integrated overlay setup of the local security structure with the dominant Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) /Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary Party (EPDRF) coalition in Dembi Dolio was prototypical of the strategy employed by the ruling regime to consolidate its power in every nook and cranny throughout the country. According to Dr. Negasso, there is no structural or functional separation of political party and public security in Dembi Dolio. The two are morphed into a single political structure which totally controls and dominates the local political and social scene. The special Woreda Town Administration is sub-divided into four large “Ganda” or villages with their own councils, each consisting of 300 members. Each kebele has representation in the Woreda Council, which is further sub-divided into zones and even smaller units called “Gare”.
There are 30 to 40 households in a “Gare” group, which is overseen by a commissariat consisting of a chairperson, a secretary, a security chief and two other members. There are up to 1 7 “Gare” in each zone with branches in every village, schools and health institutions. There is also a larger network of 24 kebeles under a Sayyo Rual Woreda. Public employees, farmers, local youth, women, members of micro-credit associations and others are involuntarily inducted into the security-party structure.
The security network is so sophisticated that it has Stalinesque quasi- directorates consisting of party and security organizations working together to maintain around-the-clock surveillance of citizens and generate and distribute real time intelligence on individual households through an established chain of command. According to Dr. Negasso, the local commissariats have expansive powers of investigation, arrest, interrogation and detention. They maintain a network of anonymous informants and agents who provide tips for the identification, investigation and arrest of local individuals suspected of disloyalty to the regime. They control and regulate the flow of information and visitors in and out of the town. Apparently, they even have the power to deport anyone considered persona non grata from the town. In general, there is little question that the commissariats and the interlocking quasi-directorates engage in repression and widespread human rights abuses against the local population.
One of the common methods of repressive local control described by
Dr. Negasso involves the use of highly intrusive security structures called
“shane”, which in Oromo means “the five”. Five households are grouped
together under a leader of the ruling party who is responsible for collecting
information on the households every day and passing it on to the “Gare”
officials. For instance, the “shane leader knows if the members of a household
have participated in “development work”, if they have contributed to the
several fund raising programs, if they have attended Qabale meetings, whether
they have registered for election, if they have voted and for whom they have
voted.” The “Gare” security chief passes information he has received from
the security network to his superiors right up the chain of command.
According to Dr. Negasso, the OPDO/EPRDF was determined not to
allow any other competitive political organization to function in the area. Any
outsiders “are secretiy followed and placed under surveillance to determine
where they have been, whom they have visited, and what they have said.
He also reported that “local people who had contact with visitors that are
summoned and grilled by security officials. In my case, my brother-in-law, with
whom I stayed, . . . received telephone calls from the Dembi Dolio and Naqamte
security offices. He was asked why I came, whether I came for preparation for
the coming election or for any other purpose.” The mechanics of the ruling
regime’s total political penetration and domination of the political process at
the local level has been documented in the March 24, 2010 report of Human
Rights Watch11:
Since 2005, state resources have also been used to press individuals to
join the ruling party so that they can benefit from access to services,
jobs, and economic activity. Between 2005 and 2008, when the
kebele and woreda (district) elections were held, the EPRDF’s party
membership more than quadrupled, from approximately 760,000
to more than 4 million members in just three years. In these local
elections in 2008, the EPRDF first expanded the number of available
positions on kebele and woreda councils and then won more than
99.9 percent of the 3.5 million seats, thus consolidating its control of
the local administrative structure. The practical implication of this
development is that in an average kebele, one of every 10 residents –
almost one member of every family – is now both a kebele official
and EPRDF member.”
On May 20, 2010, three days before election day, the New York Times reported:
Diplomats, human rights groups and witnesses say the Ethiopian
government is methodically stifling dissent in the prelude to this
supporters, jailing political opponents and possibly killing a few
activists, part of a broader pattern of repression in several of
America’s closest allies in Africa, especially during election time.”
In the run-up to the May 2010 election many commentators, including myself,
offered analysis on the impossibility of a fair and free election in Ethiopia.
The “Election Code of Conduct” Game
The ruling dictatorship of Meles Zenawi had been peddling the idea of
an “election code of conduct” months before the election to manufacture an
atmosphere of fairness and entice the opposition to field candidates. The 28-
page Code13 is a modified translation of the generic election code of conduct
devised by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA). The Code purports to regulate various aspects of the electoral
process and includes prohibitions on the use of violence and intimidation,
corrupt electoral practices and sets the parameters for proper campaigning,
electioneering, use of symbols and the like. It also professes ethical standards
for the parties to uphold. An itemized laundry list of potential violations and
sanctions for violations are provided ranging from “naming and shaming” in
the form of public exposure to outright exclusion from the electoral process.
For certain serious electoral violations amounting to criminal acts, a prison
term is indicated.
To get the various parties to sign off on the “Code”, various foreign
embassies were enlisted to do the cheerleading. Medrek, a forum for eight
political parties, walked out of “election code” talks sensing a surefire trap
down the road as election day neared. There was also some general talk of
boycotting the election in light of the unjust and illegal imprisonment of
Birtukan Midekssa, the first female political party leader in Ethiopian history
and president of the Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (UD JP). Gizachew
Shiferaw, a member of the TJDJP and vice-chairman of Medrek at one point
declared: “Unless we take some sort of remedy toward these political prisoners,
it will be difficult to look at the upcoming elections as free and fair.”14 Medrek
also demanded the establishment of an independent electoral board and an
immediate stop to harassment of opposition candidates and supporters. It
called for the presence of international election observers. Bereket Simon, a
member of Zenawi’s brain trust, dismissed the demands: “We invited them to
a dialogue in the presence of the British and German embassies. We invited
them to join negotiations. They declined. The party who walks away from the
negotiating table doesn’t have a moral right to accuse us of closing political
space.'”5
The idea of an “election code of conduct” was the window dressing the
ruling party sought to use to finesse the international community. It was a
manifestly appealing idea because it pointed to the presence of a level playing
field and an electoral process with a monitoring system. Such “codes” have
been used successfully in different countries. In principle, they are useful and
facilitate elections that are clean, and free from violence and vote rigging.
In Ethiopia, however, they were the foil used to cloak and shroud the dirty
political and electoral tricks the ruling regime had always practiced in the past.
But when the fox is guarding the election hen house, it is rather meaningless
to talk about election housekeeping rules, which is what a “code of conduct”
- Ultimately, the fox rules the henhouse with an iron fist; and though he may
agree to “fair” rules of the electoral game, he knows that in the final analysis
he holds all the cards and the opposition none. In all of the talk about elections,
the singular objective in the leadership of the ruling regime was buying time
and clinging to power indefinitely while stringing along the opposition and the
international community.
The modified IDEA code proffered by the ruling regime was insufficient
to deal with the type of fraudulent electoral practices that have occurred in
Ethiopia in prior elections and were likely to be repeated in 2010. 16 At the risk
of sounding argumentative, just as the criminal code is designed with criminals
and the criminal classes in mind, Ethiopia’s election code in 2010 should
have been designed with vote riggers, ballot stuffers, and election thieves in
mind. As Dr. Negasso’s reportage and other anecdotal evidence indicated,
the ruling party had a long record of misusing and abusing public resources,
equipment, machinery and personnel for improper electioneering work. They
have improperly used public places to hold partisan political meetings and
election rallies and prevented or made inaccessible such places on the same
terms and conditions to opposition parties and candidates. The ruling regime
completely dominated the print and electronic media, and misused it to
advance its partisan political agenda. There is ample anecdotal evidence and
reports of international human rights organizations showing that members of
the regime have directed local party functionaries to make corrupt offers and
promises of financial payoffs, grants, fertilizers, road and other public works
projects in exchange for votes. Leaders and members of the ruling party travel
throughout the country unobstructed, distribute pamphlets and posters, hold
rallies and meetings at any location of their choice while opposition parties
and candidates are at the mercy of the local police authorities who routinely
deny them permission to engage in ordinary political activity. The ruling party
has used election propaganda to appeal to ethnic prejudices, inflame historical
grievances and passions and heighten tensions among different communities
and groups.
The Impossibility of Free and Fair Elections and Constitutional Governance in Ethiopia
A free and fair election is possible only where the rule of law prevails
and fundamental human rights are respected. There is no mystery to having
free and fair elections. In theory, there is no reason why there could not have
been free and fair elections in Ethiopia in May 2010 or at any other time. Its
“constitution”, purportedly the “supreme law of the land”, guarantees voters
and candidates (and citizens in general) full freedom of speech, expression and
press and the right to publicly disseminate political messages and information
in the run up to election. The right to vote in a secret ballot is secured and there
are constitutional guarantees of a level electoral playing field by means of freely
operating political parties and civic organizations and an independent, non-
partisan electoral commission. Though there is a constitution that is manifestly
democratic, both in terms of the protections of civil liberties and rights and
structures, it is useless for all intents and purposes because of the absence of an
independent judiciary to uphold it against executive abuse and encroachments.
Moreover, there is a non-fiinctional parliament that rubberstamps the desires
and wishes of the ruling dictatorship. There could be no accountability for the
ruling party in the absence of these institutions. Ultimately, the ruling regime
must be genuinely committed to upholding the rule of law and follow the
constitutional process for the transfer of power in elections free from rigging
and manipulation.
The absence of the rule of law and dictatorial governance in Ethiopia is
borne out in specific examples. Article 9 (“Supremacy of the Constitution”) of
the Ethiopian Constitution provides that the “Constitution is the supreme law
of the land. All laws, customary practices, and decisions made by state organs
or public officials inconsistent therewith, shall be null and void. . . All citizens,
state organs, political organizations, other associations and their officials, have
the duty to comply with this Constitution and abide by it. . . Assuming power
in any manner other than as provided by this Constitution is prohibited.” In
transferring Ethiopian land to the Sudan in 2008, Zenawi violated his solemn
constitutional duties. On May 11, 2008, in response to allegations in the
“media” and among “irresponsible” elements outside the country over a land
transfer deal with the Sudan, Zenawi’s foreign ministry issued a statement
categorically denying the occurrence of any such transfer. When Sudanese
officials publicly announced acquisition of territory from Ethiopia, Zenawi
could no longer keep a lid on his secret deal; and his henchmen began to
backtrack on their initial story by mid-May. They said only preliminary work
on border demarcation had been done, but nothing had been finalized. Within
days, a new lie was invented. They nonchalantly admitted “implementing
prior agreements” concluded by the imperial/Derg regimes with the Sudan.
On May 21, Zenawi publicly described his agreement with al-Bashir17:
“We, Ethiopia and Sudan, have signed an agreement not to displace
any single individual from both sides to whom the demarcation
benefits. . .We have given back this land, which was occupied in 1996.
This land before 1996 belonged to Sudanese farmers. There is no
single individual displaced at the border as it is being reported by
some media.”
Zenawi to this day insists on keeping the actual agreement secret. But his
public statement is a treasure trove of information on the basic terms and nature
of the secret agreement. It is clear that there is an actual “signed” “Agreement”
that deals with several issues: 1) the question of non-displacement of persons
in the giveaway territories, 2) preservation of benefits of all persons affected by
border demarcation, 3) restoration of land rights to Sudanese farmers on land
supposedly occupied illegally by Ethiopian farmers, and 5) cession of lands
(“give back of land”) “occupied” by Ethiopia “in 1996” back to the Sudan.
As a constitutional matter, Zenawi had a duty to make the Agreement public
and share it with the parliamentarians in the “Council of Representatives”.
Article 5 1 , section (4) specifies that one of the “powers and duties of the Federal
government”, is to “determine foreign policy and implement the same. [It also]
enters into and ratifies international agreements.” The general foreign relations
powers of the federal government are divided between executive management
of the foreign policy field, and ratification of “international agreements” by the
parliament. Article 55, section 12, specifically reserves as one of the exclusive
“powers and duties of the Council of Peoples’ Representatives”, the power
to “ratify international agreements signed by the executive branch.” Article
86 describes the “principles of foreign relations” the federal government (the
prime minister and the Council of Peoples’ Representatives) must follow in
conducting Ethiopia’s relations with other countries and international entities.
Sections 2 and 3 provide that the federal government must follow a foreign
policy “based on equality and mutual benefit; ensuring that international
agreements entered into, protect the interests of Ethiopia” and requires “respect
[for] international laws and agreements that respect Ethiopian sovereignty and
are not contrary to the interests of its peoples.” By Zenawi’s own words, the
land deal was an “agreement” between Ethiopia and the Sudan which required
parliamentary review and approval, but remains a secret.
Another example of the absence of the rule of law and unconstitutional
action by Zenawi is the war of aggression in Somalia. In mid-December 2006,
Zenawi denied any direct military involvement in Somalia. In an interview
with the Washington Post, Zenawi explained that he had sent a few hundred
soldiers into Somalia to provide training. “It is true we have troops in Baidoa,
the capital, who are there to train forces of the transitional federal government,
who are an internationally recognized government and who have (sic) officially
asked for support from Ethiopia… Now, if the transitional government does
not want our trainers, we’d be happy to withdraw them. . .'”8 In early January,
2007, a triumphant Zenawi declared that his forces would remain in Somalia
“for a few weeks” while the transitional government stabilizes the situation.
“It is up to the international community to deploy a peacekeeping force in
Somalia without delay to avoid a vacuum and a resurgence of extremists and
terrorists.'”9
In May, 2007, Zenawi told Al Jazeera that he was not only providing
training in Somalia, he had also been invited by the transitional government
to assist in fighting terrorists. “I think we should get the facts straight first. We
did not invade Somalia. We were invited by the duly constituted government
of Somalia, internationally recognized government of Somalia to assist them
in averting the threat of terrorism. We did so.” Even though he had argued
at the outset of the invasion that Somalia was the central front in the battle
against AI Qaeda and international terrorism in the Horn of Africa, he denied
any U.S. role in the invasion: “We did not fight a proxy war on behalf of
the United States. Indeed, the United States was very ambivalent about our
intervention, once we intervened of course the United States and much of
the international community was supportive but in the initial phase before we
intervened, everybody, including the United States was warning us that we
might walk into a trap and a quagmire and that we should think twice before
taking steps.” Recent Wikileaks cablegrams suggest otherwise.20 In October,
2007, he told parliament: “So, rushing to pull out the army immediately
would have entailed a situation for the already dismantled forces of terror in
Somalia to regroup, and thereby to render void the sacrifices already made by
the Ethiopian army.” Zenawi provided no updates on the Somali invasion, the
cost in lives and resources, or any policy role for the parliament. History will
remember the invasion of Somalia as “Zenawi’s War.”
The Somali invasion has never been popular in Ethiopia. “Ethiopia’s
fractious political opposition” sent a letter to Zenawi stating that “the sacrifice
of lives and scarce financial resources had become unbearable.” Bulcha
Mideksa, an opposition party leader, stated matter-of-factly that the Somalis
“resolved to fight against us, and they are fighting, and in my opinion they are
winning.” Upwards of 20,000 thousand of Zenawi’s troops are estimated to
have been killed or severely injured in the Somali war. Amnesty International
has documented massive human rights violations by Zenawi’s troops in Somalia
including extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, beatings, arbitrary detentions,
forced disappearances and collective punishments. Zenawi says it is all a “total
fabrication”.2′ There has been no accountability for what Zenawi has done
in Somalia. Beyene Petros of the opposition United Ethiopian Democratic
Front charged, “The government has irresponsibly refused to account on these
two pertinent issues relating to the Ethiopian army’s deployment to Somalia.
Every country’s parliament, even the public at large, has a right to know what
its involvement is costing in terms of life and resources. We have been kept in
the dark.”22
In the run-up to the 2010 “election” the world witnessed a one-man, one-
party dictatorship pretending to be in competition with parties over whom
it had total dominance. Opposition parties were at a distinct disadvantage.
They were unable to receive and disseminate information to the electorate
freely, access state media on the same terms and conditions as the ruling party,
educate and canvass voters, hold meetings, conduct campaigns freely and
vigorously engage fellow citizens to exercise their right to vote in an informed
manner. The ruling party enjoyed extraordinary legal and political privileges,
advantages, benefits and entitlements because they literally own the legal and
political system. Ruling party members and leaders dominate the bureaucracies,
the courts, the police forces, the army and the local administrative structures.
Most importantly, they own the election commission. In the 2010 election, the
leaders of the ruling party served as prosecutors, judges, juries and executioners
in all matters relating to elections.
When the ruling party wins 99.6 percent of the legislative seats, it is
ludicrous to talk about a free and fair election or having a functional parliament
or a loyal opposition. With such total control of the political process, there
are no interests to be balanced or constituencies to be served other than those
of the ruling party. The parliament is merely a rubber stamp of executive
authority that is used to give the false impression of democratic governance.
The executive is not accountable to the judiciary or to the parliament, nor does
the parliament have the power to dismiss the government from office through
a vote of no confidence. As I have observed elsewhere, “You can jazz up a
bogus election in a one-man, one-party dictatorship with a ‘Code of Conduct’,
but to all the world it is still a bogus election under a one-man, one-party
dictatorship. You can put lipstick on dictatorship to make it look like a pretty
democracy, but at the end of the day, it is still an ugly dictatorship!”23
Victory of Dictatorship Over Democracy
On May 26, three days after the election, Meles Zenawi in a victory speech
(an event billed as a public protest against Human Rights Watch for its critical
report on the regime), boldly declared that he will complete his quarter century
in power. It will be business as usual; but he promised there will be a change in
style, form, appearance and public relations in the post-‘election’ period: “Hide
the iron fist in a velvet glove. Speak softly and carry a big stick.” That was
the theme of Zenawi’s grotesquely Churchillian speech. Churchill said, “In
war, resolution; in defeat, defiance; in victory, magnanimity”. In the ‘election’
battle, Zenawi was resolute. For months before election day, he had threatened
to prosecute opposition leaders for their “inflammatory” and “hateful”
campaign statements calculated to “incite violence”. A month before the
election, he even threatened to burn them at the stake if they withdrew from
the elections at the last minute and agitated the youth to demonstrate in the
streets. He threatened, “If my estimation is correct, some of you are walking
this direction [boycott the vote] I think you are making a huge mistake because
to light the fire and at the last [moment] to go into hiding, would not be good,
because to light the fire and [be] behind it, and also to fight and use the blood
of children, that would not be something that is useful.” In his defeat – that is,
the complete loss of credibility that comes from winning an election with 99.6
per cent of the seats – Zenawi was defiant. He told the West to back off and
respect Ethiopia’s sovereignty. In his 99.6 per cent electoral “victory”, he was
magnanimous – ‘let bygones be bygones’ (yalefew alfwal).
Zenawi’s velvet glove/big stick strategy is based on a simple idea of to-
tally demoralizing and humiliating the opposition, hoodwinking the Western
donors and simply fooling the people. His velvety message was that he “does
not want to be forced to embark upon the business of tracking down people
committing crimes. I would like to appeal to some opposition parties … not to
force the Government to take measures against them”. He seemed to be carry-
ing a chip on his shoulder from the drubbing his party got in 2005, when the
opposition humiliated Zenawi’s party, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF), by wining nearly every seat in Addis Ababa. It
was the opposition’s turn to be humiliated. Zenawi said, “It is to be recalled
that in the last election, five years ago, we, the EPRDF lost every seat in the
capital due to our failure to achieve our goals.” In 2005, the opposition accused
him of rigging and stealing the election; it was time to return the favor: “We all
know the destructive role some political parties have been playing so far. [They
have] attempted] to mar and discredit the polling process. They have tried to
cause delay by instructing their observers to arrive late at the polling stations.
They have tried to disrupt the queues, make all sorts of shouts and cries, …
[and even] sen[t] in their members with grenades to detonate among people
queuing at polling stations … We have also observed successful and unsuc-
cessful attempts by members of some of the opposition parties to snatch away
ballot boxes and burn the votes of the people.”
Zenawi extended an olive branch to his vanquished opposition wrapped in
condescending cordiality and paternalism. He promised to allow them to have
input so long as they behave and pull no punches: “We make this pledge to all
the parties who did not succeed in getting the support of the people, during
this election, that whether or not you have won seats in the parliament, as long
as you respect the will of the people and the country’s Constitution and other
laws of the land, we will work by consulting and involving you in all major
national issues. We are making this pledge not only because we believe that
we should be partners … [but also] you have the right to participate and to be
heard.” The message was unmistakable. The opposition will be put on a short
and tight leash and their scope action will be closely monitored for progressive
discipline; and the iron fist will be unsheathed from the velvet glove and the
big stick pulled out to drive that point home whenever necessary. No political
prisoners will be released, including Birtukan Midekssa.24 More will be added.
There will be no independent press. Civic society organizations will not be
allowed to operate freely. Judges will remain in the back pockets of the ruling
regime. Justice, and pieces of the country, will be up for sale to the highest bid-
der, and on and on. Business will be conducted in the same way it has for the
last 19 years!
International Reaction to the May 2010 Elections and How the
West Aided and Abetted in Democricide in Ethiopia
The “preliminary statement” of the European Union Election Observation
Mission Ethiopia 2010 stated: “The electoral process fell short of certain
international commitments, notably regarding the transparency of the process
and the lack of a level playing field for all contesting parties.” The White House
issued a statement expressing “concern that international observers found that
the elections fell short of international commitments. We are disappointed that
US Embassy officials were denied accreditation and the opportunity to travel
outside of the capital on Election Day to observe the voting.” Johnnie Carson,
the assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the state department told
the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs that “we note with some degree
of remorse that the elections were not up to international standards … The
[Ethiopian] government has taken clear and decisive steps that would ensure
that it would garner an electoral victory.” Even Herman Cohen, the former US
assistant secretary of state who served as “mediator” in the so-called May 1991
London Peace Talks which resulted in the establishment of the Zenawi regime
decried the outcome: “This time opposition media and opposition groups were
not given fair time on the media and opposition media tends to be suppressed
and in that sense I don’t think it was a fair election.”
Zenawi appeared nonplussed by Western donors’ manifest repudiation of
his election victory. He pleaded: “We have seen those we believed were friends
and partners behaving like king makers and an appeal court for Ethiopia’s
politics. Our proud people would still like to extend a warm welcome of
friendship and partnership. We say to you: Please give due respect to the
decision and the sovereign power of the people to elect their own leaders.”
Zenawi’s strategy in dealing with the Western donors has always been the
same: He is the only game in town. The donors have no alternatives to him
because there is no viable opposition, principally because he had wiped them
out. The donors want stability above all things and will tolerate anything he
does. They don’t really believe in democracy and human rights anyway; they
believe only in advancing their national interests. They do not have the guts
to take any action against him because he will threaten to cut them off and
go with the Chinese. In any case, they have never taken any serious actions
against him and never will. He regards them as a bunch of hypocritical, forked-
tongue, double-dealing and double-talking windbags. America is not going
to do anything because of her preoccupation with terrorism in the Horn of
Africa. To ease the criticism on the donors, he will give them diplomatic cover
by touting that he has achieved “double digit economic growth”, built roads,
schools and other infrastructure. In any case, if push comes to shove, he will
attack them by claiming that they are interfering in the country’s sovereignty
and affronting the Ethiopian people.
If truth be told, Zenawi would not be necessarily inaccurate in his view.
The US, Britain and the European Union have poured in tens of billions of
dollars of aid to support his regime for nearly two decades while pontificating
about democracy and human rights endlessly. They took no action when he
passed a so-called press law criminalizing free speech and the free press after
the 2005 election. They just moaned and groaned about it a little. They took no
action when he passed a so-called civic society law that effectively banned civic
organizations. They have taken no action against him despite a nearly two
decade uninterrupted record of gross human rights violations and criminality.
All they have done is dump the blame on the opposition: “There is no viable
alternative in the opposition.”25 They know full well that the opposition is
subjected to daily threats, intimidations, arbitrary arrests and detentions and
violence, yet they have mustered the audacity to blame them for being “not
viable”. As I have argued previously, the Western donors have entered into a
conspiracy of silence to see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil of Zenawi.26
The role of the West in maintaining the current dictatorship has been
pivotal and reprehensible.27 Zenawi has successfully charmed Western donors
into believing that he is not only the savior of Ethiopia but also the continent.
He has trumpeted highly questionable economic growth rates and development
and proffered a faux federal system as the solution to the country’s political
problems. The West has turned a blind eye to the notorious fact that Zenawi is
the sole power with unlimited decision-making powers. In a recent “Briefing”,
Prof. Kjetil Tornvoll correctly points out that part of the problem for the
still birth of democracy in Ethiopia has to do with the midwifery Western
governments have provided in legitimizing the anti-democratic actions of the
Zenawi dictatorship28.
Donor-country diplomats, especially, are charmed by this formal
façade of Ethiopian politics and always place high hopes in the
promises offered by the political leadership. When asked about the
political state of play in Ethiopia, they point to the improvements
in the sphere of parties, the legal framework or the media, the
reduced level of public violence, the absence of civil war, the relative
scarcity of random killings and abductions of opponents, the prudent
macro-economic policy, and the liberalization of the economy and
the political system. In this, the despised Derg dictatorship (1974-
91), and perhaps the disarray in neighbouring Somalia, is still the
measure. This approach tends to underestimate the authoritarian
patrimonialized system in place. This limits democratization and
reform and, in effect, tends to perpetuate the rule of a party and an
elite that cannot afford to relinquish hard-earned power.
Manufacturing Democracy in Ethiopia
Conventional political science would explain what happened in Ethiopia’s 2010
election in terms of neopatrimonialism and personal rule, or prebendalism
in which “state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated
by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves
and their constituents and kin groups…”29 In a prebendalist political system,
rulers cling to power by sustaining and balancing the interests of a network
of patrons, clients, supporters, and rivals. Nepotism, corruption, tribalism (or
ethnicity), and clientelism are said to be constitutive elements of the prebendai
state.30
In his “Briefing” explaining the 2010 Ethiopian elections, Tronvoll
explores three seminal questions to explain the internal mechanics of Zenawi’s
prebendai state31: 1) Whether the opposition’s “radical setback” and the
“total victory of the EPDRF” could be explained by occurrences during the
election or preceding the election. 2) Whether the “outcome of the following
independent election represents the genuine will of the Ethiopian electorate
and 3) Whether the ruling EPDRF party is as “popular” as Zenawi claims it is.
Tronvoll suggests that there has been “significant political institution building”
and growth of the “public ethos of democracy” in Ethiopia since the rise of
the Meles dictatorship32, but the
the process is still closely controlled by the ruling Tigray People’s
Liberation Front-Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic
Front (TPLF-EPRDF), and has a high ingredient of rhetoric not
backed by practice. In conditions of political insecurity and contested
legitimacy, a network of political and economic control was built up
by this party from its circle of trusted people, loyalists, and former
comrades in the armed struggle. Thus, a selective hold on politics
and economics in Ethiopia was established. There is a new, party-
affiliated business class, and the non-party-affiliated business people
regularly complain of unfair and non-transparent competition and
preferential treatment. Most of the political decision-making seems
to occur outside the cabinet of ministers and the parliament, as is
evident at crucial moments. . .
Tronvoll further explains the vertical integration and entrenchment of the neo-
patrimonial state of the ruling TPLF/EPDRF33:
Their political-economic stakes are now great. Many people in
positions of power from the federal level in Addis Ababa to the
k’ebele (local community) level are appointed because of loyalty
to the party; they have income, privileges, and jobs to lose and will
not voluntarily give them up, because unemployment, insecurity, or
poverty is waiting. An old saying in Ethiopia is: ‘He who does not
“eat” while in power, will regret it when he is out’. This still holds. So
next to substantial ideological differences. . . there is a deep economic,
if not survival, logic behind the political process in Ethiopia. The state
resembles a domain of personalized power and resource competition
through the instrumentalization of vertical loyalties among special,
strategic constituencies. Resource competition, although not
explaining all, goes a long way in accounting for Ethiopia’s exclusivist
and conflictual political dynamics. It must be said that the TPLF-
EPRDF has done much to realize economic reforms in Ethiopia but
did not complete its political agenda, which included entrenching
power and transforming Ethiopian political culture (towards ethnic
politics), social structure (neutralization of interest groups based
on private business, or ‘narrow nationalist’ regional identities), and
public mentalities (eliminating, or at least containing, the influence
of religion in public life, balancing and co-opting Christianity and
Islam, and inculcating ethnic consciousness).
The fact of the matter is that the dictatorship that rules Ethiopia today is a
classic African kleptocracy, “a state controlled and run for the benefit of an
individual, or a small group, who use their power to transfer a large fraction
of society’s resources to themselves.”34 To describe the regime as another
manifestation of African prebendalism is to refuse to call a spade a spade.
As I have argued elsewhere35, in Ethiopia publicly-owned assets are acquired
by regime-supporters or officials through illegal transactions and fraud. Banks
loan millions of dollars to front enterprises owned by regime officials or their
supporters without sufficient or proper collateral. Businessmen must pay huge
bribes or kickbacks to participate in public contracting and procurement. Those
involved in the import/export business complain of shakedowns by corrupt
customs officials. The judiciary is thoroughly corrupted through political
interference and manipulation as evidenced in the various high profile political
prosecutions. Ethiopians on holiday visits driving about town complain of
shakedowns by police thugs on the streets. Helen Epstein has sketched out the
nature of the kleptocratic state in Ethiopia.36
George Ayittey argues that Africa has been transformed into a collection
of “vampire states”: “What obtains in many African countries cannot be
called a state or government. It is a ‘state’ that has been hijacked by a cabal of
crooks and gangsters… The system of governance prevailing in Africa today
is a crises producing machine: agricultural crises, debt crises, environmental
crises, population crises and so on…”37 Free fair elections in “vampire states”
or kleptocracies cannot occur because legislative and judicial institutions are
weak, formal institutional rules such as constitutions are ignored and there
are no meaningful and effective ways of holding politicians accountable. The
kleptocrats deliberately make institutions weak and dysfunctional to allow
them to escape accountability and respond to the needs and demands of
citizens.
The 2010 Ethiopian electoral farce had ample precedent elsewhere in
Africa. Robert Bates38 has shown that in Ghana and Zambia kleptocratic
regimes systematically transferred “resources from the population to the
ruling groups, while at the same time ensuring their political survival.” In
Bates’ study, the Ghanaian government heavily taxed cocoa producers, while
at the same time subsidizing their inputs of seeds and fertilizers. The subsidies
could be allocated selectively as a potential reward for not attempting to
change the status quo. Zenawi’s regime similarly used Safety Net Program
payments, emergency food assistance and other aid to reward its supporters,
while marginalizing those it considered disloyal or supportive of opposition
elements.
Kleptocrats rely on divide and rule strategies to maintain their power.
They bribe and politically compromise politically pivotal groups and set them
against each other to ensure their grip on power and stave off any credible
challenges. Zenawi has been successful in preventing diverse opposition groups
from coming together and working cooperatively and challenging his rule by
providing selective incentives and punishments. In the run up to the election,
he raised all sorts of boogeymen to scare the people including the threat that
victory for the opposition means the return of the hated military Derg. Zenawi
understands that the relationship between opposition elements is fragile and
takes every opportunity to exploit that to his advantage.
Having an Election in a Dictatorship is Like Putting Lipstick on a Pig
The bottom line about the 2010 election in Ethiopia is that it was a
meaningless exercise in political futility. As I have previously argued, one
could put lipstick on a pig to make her look pretty, but at the end of the day
she is still a pig39. By the same token, one can have an election in a one-party
dictatorship and call it democratic but at the end of the day, a dictatorship is not
a democracy nor a rigged election free and fair. In 2010, the ruling dictatorship
of Meles Zenawi jazzed up a bogus election with a “Code of Conduct”,
imported African and European Union election observers, pretended to have
public debates on state-controlled media and went through the motions of a free
and fair election. In the end, he won 99.6 percent of the parliamentary seats.
The inescapable fact is that there could be no genuine democratic elections so
long as the dictatorship of Meles Zenawi and his party remain in power. For
historical and ideological reasons, that dictatorship has determined that it has
a divine right to rule under the guise of democracy. The dictatorship will not
give up power they have gained through the barrel of the gun by letting others
take it at the ballot box. They also do not believe in peaceful political change
through elections.
Over the past two decades, the nature of political power and domination
in Ethiopia has changed very little. Formal institutions of government are in
place but the real decisions are made by a “government within a government”,
a core group of leaders of the TPLF and loyalists of Meles Zenawi. There are
effectively two set of ‘governments”: the real one consisting of Zenawi and
his cohorts and the one for show complete with a rubber stamp parliament,
principally for the benefit of Western donors who pump billions into the
economy supporting the regime.
The Opposition in the 2010 Election
What happened to the Ethiopian opposition in the election of 2010?
Zenawi will argue vigorously that he defeated them by a margin of 99.6
percent. If that were the real “defeat” for the opposition, there would be little
cause for concern. Losing a sham election is the equivalent of losing one’s
appendix. Unfortunately, the opposition parties and leaders suffered a grievous
loss of collective credibility in the eyes and hearts of the people by making
a public spectacle of their endless bickering, carping, dithering, internal
squabbles, disorganization, inability to unite, pettiness, jockeying for power,
and by failing to articulate a coherent set of guiding principles or ideas for the
country’s future.
In the 2005 election, there was a unifying spirit among opposition
leaders and parties. Because the opposition created a united front, they were
able to trounce the ruling dictatorship in a free and fair election. What was
monumental about the 2005 election was not only the fact that the opposition
thumped the ruling party, but they did so with overflowing and overwhelming
public enthusiasm. On May 7, 2005, a week before elections that year, the
opposition was able to hold a rally in the capital for an estimated 3 million
people. On May 15, over 26 million people voted freely giving the opposition
a decisive victory in the parliamentary elections, including a clean sweep of
seats in the capital. That election was stolen by the ruling dictatorship after
hundreds of unarmed protesters were massacred and shot in the streets and
thousands more imprisoned and disappeared. In 2005, the Ethiopian people
put their lives and livelihoods on the line.
Where did the people go in 2010? They did not vanish merely because
Zenawi had unloosed his trigger-happy goons on the streets. They did not
show up because they had lost faith in the leadership of the opposition. When
Zenawi herded the opposition leaders into his dungeons after the 2005 election,
the people kept faith with them. They kept them in their hearts and minds and
thoughts and prayers. Did the opposition leaders keep faith with the people
after they were “pardoned” and released from prison in 2007? That is perhaps
the hardest truth for the opposition leaders to face and accept. I have heard it
said anecdotally hundreds of times. The opposition leaders have deeply and
sorely disappointed the people. In their words, deeds and conduct, they have
failed to uphold and sustain the people’s dreams, aspirations and longing for
justice and democracy. The people feel betrayed and abandoned40 by many
opposition leaders in whom they placed so much trust. Tronvoll convincingly
argues41:
[A] culture of fear has been reintroduced into Ethiopian politics after
the unprecedented ‘liberal spring’ of the 2005 campaign. The violent
and widespread crackdown on the opposition after the 2005 elections,
in combination with new restrictive government policies and alarmist
rhetoric, have aroused trepidation among most Ethiopians and
revived old memories of the political purges during the Red Terror
campaign of the 1970s. Consequently, the preferred individual
political strategy is one of disengagement and apathy, shying away
from politics in order not to become a victim. Since the rural elite all
suffered after the 2005 display of opposition support, and had been
subjected to massive strategies of cooptation and party enrolment,
their choice was clear – and opposition ‘defeat was inevitable from as
early as autumn 2005’.
Zenawi knows the opposition and how they operate very well. His
condescending and patronizing public statements over the years suggest that
he views opposition leaders to be his intellectual inferiors: He can outwit,
outthink, outsmart, outplay, outfox and outmaneuver them any day of the
week. He believes they are dysfunctional, shiftless and inconsequential, and
will never be able to pose a real challenge to his power. In his speeches and
public comments, he shows nothing but contempt and hatred for them.42
At best, he sees them as wayward children who need constant supervision,
discipline and punishment to keep them in line. Like children, he will offer
some of them candy – jobs, cars, houses and whatever else it takes — to buy
their silence. Those he cannot buy, he will intimidate, place under continuous
surveillance and persecute. Mostly, he tries to fool and trick the opposition.
He will send “elders” to talk to them and lullaby them to sleep while he drags
out “negotiations” to buy just enough time to pull the rug from underneath
them. After his “election victory”, Zenawi extended an olive branch to the
opposition wrapped in his inimitable condescending cordiality, magnanimity
and paternalism. In other words, he will set up a “kitchen cabinet” for the nice
opposition leaders to come in through the back door and chit-chat with him.
But they will never be allowed to get out of the kitchen and sit at the dining
table.
From Bushcraft to Statecraft
I have expressed my views on the limitations of the ruling regime in Ethiopia
and its leaders on numerous occasions in the past43:
The dictators of Ethiopia are trapped in a historical time warp. They
have clutched the reigns of state for two decades and ostentatiously
display the trappings of political power and wealth. But they have
not been able to transform ‘bushcraft’ into statecraft … In their armed
campaign against the Derg junta, decision-making was left in the
hands of the few. The few leaders exercised raw, brute power over
their followers and the communities they controlled. They silenced
dissent and criticism ruthlessly, and leaders who disagreed were
marginalized, labeled as traitors and removed. Everything was done
in secrecy. Power was understood not as a public duty but as a means
of self-enrichment, politiceli patronage and intimidation. Leadership
meant the cult of personality. The best they have been able to do is
to transform the ‘politics of the bush’ fighting the Derg into a one-
man, one-party state, whose guiding motto is, ‘What is good for the
TPLF/EPDRF is good for Ethiopia!’
The transition from “bushcraft” to statecraft has eluded Zenawi and his
regime since its takeover of power in 1991. Democratic statecraft requires
an appreciation, understanding and application of basic democratic
principles such as the rule of law, separation of powers, checks and balances
and constitutionalism in the governance process. The dictators have little
experience with or practical understanding of such principles. They never had
free elections in the bush; and it is no wonder that they were totally surprised
when they got thumped in the 2005 elections. Upholding the rule of law is
absurd to them because they believe themselves to be The Law. They scoff
at civil liberties and civil rights as Western luxuries because they have never
experienced a system where the powers of government are constitutionally
subordinated to the rights of the individual. In short, it is wishful thinking to
expect from them the kind of statecraft necessary for democratic governance
based on the rule of law. In 20 1 0, it was clear Mr. Zenawi had learned important
lessons from his 2005 mistakes, and subsequently took a series of preemptive
measures to skew the election result completely in his favor. He shuttered
critical newspapers, jammed the Voice of America, blocked critical websites,
banned all forms opposition rallies, crippled civil society organizations, and
deliberately fomented divisions in the opposition camp.
Zenawi always argues that Western-style democracy is not possible in
Ethiopia. Foreign pressure to produce such is improper and unworkable,
he proclaims. But the point is no kind of democracy is possible in Ethiopia
because the prerequisites for democratic governance have been destroyed.
Zenawi’s regime has used repressive media and civil society laws to neutralize
any meaningful opposition or activity by dissidents and opposition elements.
It has built an elaborate Stalinist organization that penetrates every nook and
cranny of the society, which by 2008 had reached some 3.5 million members
at the local administrative levels and expanding its party members by millions
more. For the past two decades, he has made it impossible for a democratic
culture to grow, rooted out the seeds planted in 2005 and made a travesty of
the institution of representation by creating rubberstamp parliaments, buying
votes with foreign aid, herding citizens into local level organizations to vote
and destroying all notions of electoral, judicial and legislative accountability
through a system of personal rule based on a kleptocratic structure. When
the ruling dictatorship uprooted the seeds of democracy, it unwittingly left
the seeds of its own destruction to sprout up. The people’s expectations for
democratic governance can never be extinguished. The dictatorship in Ethiopia
will not be able to withstand the first major wind of popular uprising; and it
does not have the ideological or political platform to overcome a major crisis.
Ultimately, Ethiopia’s cartoon democracy under the regime of Meles
Zenawi will offer Zenawi and his ruling party neither legitimacy nor the
consensus they crave to democratically lead the nation. The lesson Zenawi and
company should learn from their cartoon democracy is that their dictatorship
is very fragile and will wither away and collapse as soon as Zenawi is no longer
on the political scene. There is today great disillusionment and cynicism in
Ethiopia about the domination of one-man and one-political party for nearly
two decades. The economy is in complete shambles and Zenawi is carting off
business men and merchants to jail for price gouging and economic sabotage.
Zenawi can stay in power through foreign aid and the financial support of the
multilateral banks and brute force. But in a post-Zenawi era, it is very possible
to realistically imagine a pluralist democracy in Ethiopia not unlike those in
the West.
Notes
1 “Meles Clashes with EU about Elections Report”, Voice of America, November
15, 2010. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Meles-Clashes-with-EU-about-
Elections-Report- 1081 36234.html
2 “Ethiopia Official Condemns EU Report,” Associated Press, August 29, 2005.
http://nazret.com/blog/index.php/2005/08/27/ethiopia_blames_eu_for_protests
3 See fn. 1.
4 Statement by HR Catherine Ashton on the Legislative Elections in Ethiopia, EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, Brussels, 25 May 2010, IP/ 10/607,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/ 607&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
5 http://www.eueom.eu/ files/pressreleases/ english/ final-report-eueom-
ethiopia-081 12010_en.pdf
6 “The Arrival Statement of the African Union Observer Mission to the Ethiopia
Legislative Elections 23rd May, 2010, Issued at the AU Observer Mission Secretariat Addis
Ababa, Hilton Hotel, 18th May 2010. An AU Pre-Elections Assessment Mission had
arrived in the country in early February and met with officials of the ruling regime.
7 “Preliminary Statement of the African Union Observer Mission to the
Ethiopia Legislative Elections 23rd May, 2010, Issued at the AU Observer Mission
Secretariat Addis Ababa, Hilton Hotel, 26th May 2010.
8 http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/ Calendar_of_%20Events/
Election%20Democratie/ELECTION%20OBSERVATION%20%20MONITORING%20
GUIDELINES.pdf
9 Ibid.,
10 Gidada, Negasso. “No Level Playing Field for the 2010 Election,” October 12,
2009, http://www.ethiomedia.com/adroit/4222.html
11 “One Hundred Ways of Putting on Pressure,” Human Rights Watch, March
24, 2010. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/03/24/ one-hundred-ways-putting-
pressure-0
This content downloaded from 139.182.75.138 on Wed, 08 Jan 2020 17:13:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
50 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHIOPIAN STUDIES (V:2)
12 Mariam, Alemayehu. “Ethiopia at the Crossroads of History,” May 22, 2010. http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/ethiopia-at-the-crossroad_b_586125.
html; see also ffa. 25.
13 http://www.gadaa.com/partyagreemnet03009.pdf
14 “Ethiopian Opposition Says It May Boycott Elections,” Bloomberg News.
October 10, 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agdO
Aq2GuwtY
15 Ibid.
16 The 2009 Model Code of Election Conduct of India (Model Code) offers arguably
the best archetype that could be adopted for elections in Ethiopia. The Model Code is “a
unique document that has evolved with the consensus of political parties themselves and the
Commission implements and enforces it with the aim of providing a level playing field for
all political parties and ensuring free and fair elections.” It is comprehensive and addresses
nearly every potentially disruptive and unfair election practice that could undermine
confidence in an election outcome. It disapproves of actions and messages by any party
that creates ethnic hatred or communal tensions, prohibits the use of inflammatory rhetoric
based on personal attacks and false allegations; it strongly discourages demagogic appeals
to communal feelings and divisive propaganda for votes; and it prohibits and penalizes
corrupt and illegal practices such as bribery, voter intimidation, violation of election laws,
improper use of public property and resources for partisan advantages.
17 “Demarcation of Ethiopia-Sudan border “will not displace anybody”, Agence de
Presse de Africaine, http://www.apanews.net/apa.php7article64247
18 “Transcript: Interview With Meles Zenawi,” The Washington Post, December
14, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/ 14/
AR2006121400820.html
19 “Ethiopians to Stay in Somalia,: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), January
2, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/6224163.stm
20 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/ethiopia-so-
what_b_798882.html
21 “Collective Punishment: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the
Ogaden Area of Ethiopia’s Somali Region”, Human Rights Watch, June 11, 2008.
22 “Unified Ethiopian Opposition Seeks Troop Withdrawal From Somalia,” Voice
of America (VOA), October 2, 2008. http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2008-
1 0-02-voa39-6660 141 7.html
23 Mariam, Alemayehu. “Putting Lipstick on a Pig, Ethiopian Style,” The Huffington
Post, February 1, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/putting-
lipstick-on-a-pig_b_4441 70.html
24 Birtukan was released in October 2010. Mariam, Alemayehu. “Birtukan
Unbound,” The Huffington Post, October 10, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
alemayehu-g-mariam/ethiopia-birtukan-unbound_b_757501.html
25 Mariam, Alemayehu. “Of Elections and Diapers in Ethiopia,” Pambazuka News,
June 3, 2010. http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/64929
26 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/western-diplomatic-
omerta_b_45 3003 .html
This content downloaded from 139.182.75.138 on Wed, 08 Jan 2020 17:13:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CARTOON DEMOCRACY: ETHIOPIA’S 2010 ELECTION
27 See e.g. Mariam, Alemayehu. “Speaking Truth to Strangers”, The Huffington
Post, June 14, 2010. http://www.hufFmgtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/ethiopia-
speaking-truth-t_b_6 1 0743 .html
28 Kjetil Trionvoll, “Briefing: The Ethiopian 2010 Federal and Regional Elections:
Reestablishing the One-Party State,” African Affairs, Advance Access published November
26, 2010. http://www.ethioobserver.net/Ethiopian_2010%20federal_election_state.pdf
29 Joseph, Richard A. , ( 1 987). Democracy and Prebendai Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and
Fall of the Second Republic , Cambridge University Press.
30 See e.g. Jackson, Robert H. and Carl G. Rösberg (1982). Personal Rule in Black
Africa. University of California Press. Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van der Walle (1997);
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge
University Press; van der Walle, Nicolas (2001). African Economies and the Politics of
Permanent Crisis , 1979-1999 . Cambridge University Press; Sandbrook, Richard (1985). The
Politics of Africa ‘s Economic Stagnation. Cambridge University Press; Herbst, Jeffrey I. (2000).
States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton University
Press.
31 See fn. 28.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Thierry Verdier , “Alfred Marshall Lecture:
Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule”, Journal of the European
Economic Association, Vol. 2, No. 2/3, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual
Congress of the European Economic Association (Apr. May, 2004), pp. 162-192.
35 Mariam, Alemayehu. “Africorruption, Inc.”, November 26, 2010. http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/africorruption-inc_b_367268.html
36 Epstein, Helen. “Cruel Ethiopia”, N.Y. Review of Books, May 13, 2010. http://
www.nybooks.com/articles /archives/20 1 0/may / 1 3 /cruel-ethiopia/
37 Ayittey, George. Africa in Chaos , N.Y.: St. Martin’s (1999), pp. 185; see also Chap.
5, “The Vampire African State”.
38 Bates, Robert H. (1981). Markets and States in Tropical Africa. University of
California Press.
39 See fh. 23.
40 Mariam, Alemayehu. “Speaking Truth to the Powerless, The Huffington Post,
June 7, 2010. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alemayehu-g-mariam/ethiopia-speaking-
truth-t_b_602507.html
41 See fn. 28.
42 Mariam, Alemayehu. “Meles Zenawi – Waiting for Godot to Leave? AllAfrica.
com, March 4, 2010. http://allafrica.com/stories/201003041003.html
43 Mariam, Alemayehu. “How to Reinvent Ethiopian Politics,” Pambazuka News,
January 21, 2010. http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61623
This content downloaded from 139.182.75.138 on Wed, 08 Jan 2020 17:13:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
