Modernising Internal Security in Ethiopia
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British Army (Rtd)

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Section 1: Background

Genesis of the Project

1. The Think Tank meets regularly at the Ethiopian Embassy in London. Its membership consists of a number of experts on Ethiopia, including HE the Ethiopian Ambassador in London and an ex-British Ambassador to Ethiopia. The Think Tank has, over time, focussed on a wide range of issues inside Ethiopia including Tourism, Medical Education, and Management of Information. Their reports and papers have been welcomed by the Minister of Capacity Building, HE Ato Tefera Waluwa. They have provided an additional independent parallel source of thinking and research that has complemented UK Governmental and NGO input to the Ethiopian Government. Most recently, members have become interested in internal security, especially in the context of the Ethiopian Federal Police over recent years. An incident in 1997 and, more importantly, the anti-government riots of 2005 provided cause for concern, especially amongst the international Human Rights community. The Think Tank therefore considered that it might be timely to propose a study looking at the modus operandi of the Federal Police, paying special attention to riot control capabilities and procedures. When Minister Ato Tefera Waluwa was approached, he readily agreed to funding the Enquiry especially since there has been a marked disagreement by the international community in general and by the UK Government in particular since 2005 in providing aid and assistance in the security sector in Ethiopia.

2. Colonel Michael Dewar was appointed to research and write the paper. The rationale for an ex-military author rather than an ex-UK police author is that in the UK the British Army are as much, if not more, experienced in riot control techniques than the UK police. In most other European nations there is usually a para-military task force to deal with civil disturbances, akin to the Ethiopian Federal Police e.g. the Compagnie Républicaine de Securité (CRS) and Gendarmerie in France, the Carabineri in Italy, The Guardia Civile in Spain and the Bundesgrenshutz in Germany. In the UK there is no such third force. In Northern Ireland, during the period 1969-2002, the level of violence went beyond the capabilities of the local police (the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), now the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)), so the Army filled this role. They were already trained in riot control in that in the period 1945-1969 during the withdrawal from places such as Cyprus, Aden, Hong Kong, Malaya, Kenya, British Guyana, Palestine, Egypt, India, Pakistan etc. Indeed it is probably true to say that the British Army is more experienced and knowledgeable in the business of crowd control and riot control than any other Army or Police Force in the world. In recent years, in particular since the National Miners strike in 1984, UK police forces have also taken on that expertise.

3. A CV of the author is in Annex A.

4. Terms of Engagement

The author proposed that the study should be undertaken in four phases:

- Phase 1: Reconnaissance and fact-finding trip to Addis Ababa - 15-21 March 08
- Phase 2: Further remote study in UK and production of paper and action plan over 15 working days during April/May/June 08
- Phase 3: Presentation of Plan to relevant authority in Addis Ababa - Late Summer/Autumn 08
- Phase 4: Implementation of Plan over time with monitoring and further recommendations by the author

5. Minister Ato Tefera Waluwa approved the above Plan. He also requested that the author should approach the Metropolitan Police informally at this stage to determine whether they would be prepared to help implementing the changes when these have been agreed.

6. The author contacted the Metropolitan Police in early March 08 before leaving London for Addis Ababa. It became apparent that the Metropolitan Police could only be tasked by the FCO. At the same time the Think Tank invited Lord Malloch-Brown, Minister at the FCO, to visit the Think Tank. He was aware of the author's visit to Addis Ababa, was entirely happy with it going ahead and asked to be kept in the loop. He suggested that it would be wise to wait a little longer before approaching the British Government with this request.

7. The author therefore visited the British Embassy in Addis on two occasions to ensure that the FCO were kept fully informed and found there was general agreement that the visit was timely.

8. **Briefing Programme in Addis Ababa 15 - 21 March 08**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>Depart Heathrow</td>
<td>p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 March</td>
<td>Arrive Addis Ababa</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 March</td>
<td>Meet Minister AtoTefera Waluwa, Meet Director General, Ethiopian Federal Police, Ato Workneh Gebeyehu, Briefing Federal Police HQ, Visit British Embassy – talks with Gavin Cook, Second Secretary Political Information</td>
<td>0900 - 1000 1100 - 1100 11.00 -1300</td>
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<td>18 March</td>
<td>Discussions - Federal Policy HQ, Drive to Federal Riot Police for Riot Techniques, Drills and Equipment Demonstration, Drive to Federal Police Recruit Training Centre and tour facility, Discussion with Commander Girmay Kahesay, Chief of Staff and Special Assistance for the Director General</td>
<td>0830 - 0930 0930 - 1200 1400 – 1600 1600 - 1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March</td>
<td>Drive to Federal Police College outside Addis Ababa and tour facility, Visit Addis Ababa Police Station and Detention Facility, Dinner with Senior Federal Police Officers</td>
<td>0900 – 1300 p.m. 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>Discussion with Director General and staff, Visit British Embassy – talks with Benedict Latto, Government Adviser, DFID Ethiopia, Discussion with Minister AtoTefera Waluwa, Ministry of Capacity Building</td>
<td>a.m. p.m. 1800 - 1930</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 March</td>
<td>Travel from Addis Ababa to Heathrow</td>
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Section 2: The Aim

9. The Terms of Reference of this study were set out by Minister Tefera Waluwa in his memo of 2 Jan 2008 CR/MOI/029/08.

“Dear Colonel Dewar

Modernising Internal Security in Ethiopia

Thank you for your proposal on 'Modernising Internal Security in Ethiopia' which you presented to the Think Tank in London on the 10th May 2007. This has been fully considered by the Government of Ethiopia on whose behalf I am writing to you. The Government would like you to proceed with your proposals, paying particular attention to the following points:

You should bear in mind that the main objective of the Security Forces is to maintain order at all times without having to resort to undue force in general and to the use of firearms in particular.

After completing the initial assessment as described in Phase 1, you should make recommendations designed to create a modern security force that will function effectively by using strategies designed to pre-empt civil unrest which threatens the security of the State of Ethiopia and its People, as described in Phase 2 & 3. You should also make recommendations on the equipping and training of such a Security force.

We would also like you to approach the Metropolitan Police informally at this stage, to determine whether they would be prepared to help in implementing the changes when these have been agreed.

Your recommendations should be contained in a Report which will be considered by the Government with a view to implementing all or some of them. The Government of Ethiopia is willing, at all times, to help you to achieve these initial objectives, as outlined in your paper and to meet your specified changes.

Best regards
Tefera Waluwa, Minister

10. Having completed Phase 1 (the reconnaissance in Addis Ababa), and spoken to the Minister at great length, having completed extensive discussions with the Director General and a range of senior officers in the Federal Police of Ethiopia, been immersed for a working week in every aspect of the Federal Police's facilities in Addis Ababa, and spoken with staff at the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, the author has given considerable thought to devising a meaningful aim to this paper. We believe that, whilst the paper must clearly meet the precise remit of Minister Tefera, there are some wider issues which became apparent during our studies that might be included to add balance to our recommendations.

11. The aim of this paper therefore is to recommend a framework that will ensure the Ethiopian Federal Police are properly established, trained funded and equipped to support the Federal Government in the maintenance of order and stability in the Capital in a manner that is acceptable to the wider international community, in particular, regarding human rights.
Section 3: Limitations/Extensions to the Aim

12. This paper does not set out to just concentrate on riot control techniques. Rather, the author recognises that there is a moment in time when friendly governments can seize the opportunity to favour Ethiopia in the immediate future in order to build a centre of stability in the Horn of Africa. There is some evidence to suggest that the UK and other friendly governments have been imprisoned in a ‘catch-22’ situation for some years now. Because the Federal Police were inadequately trained, undermanned and ill-equipped in the 2005 Addis Ababa civil disturbances surround the Elections at that time. In earlier incidents in the late 1990s, they were unable to deal with these disturbances effectively or efficiently. Practically all the anti-riot equipment which the author saw on his visit to the Federal Police has been purchased since 2005; expert anti-riot training has been provided by the South African Police since 2005 and, perhaps most important, the strength of the riot-trained elements of the Federal Police has increased from only 2000 in 2005 to 6000 in 2008. In other words, if the same situation were to occur again, the Federal Police would now be more capable of dealing with it.

13. There is some evidence that Western governments have not taken these fundamental changes into account. The circular argument is that because of past misdemeanours by the Federal Police, Western governments cannot risk the same thing happening again. Clearly, if this risk-averse attitude is maintained, little progress will be possible.

14. This paper will seek to demonstrate that dramatic and substantial progress has been made in the ethos, operational effectiveness and efficiency of the Ethiopian Federal Police Force so that the risk factor is now greatly reduced, and to the extent that it is possible, that it is now the time to seize the moment to assist Ethiopia- particularly in the form of expert advice.

Section 4: Context/Factors

14. Geo-Political/Strategic Context

a) Ethiopia's military presence in Somalia has fostered anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalia in both Somalia and Ethiopia, an attitude which is being encouraged by members of the former Somali Union of Islamic Courts and key figures in other Islamic organizations (including al-Qaeda). The spill over effect from the unrest in Somalia is evident in Ethiopia as military engagements have occurred along the south-eastern border of Ethiopia and within Somalia; however its destabilizing effect is much more limited than initially expected. So far the conflict in Somalia has not escalated and no significant attacks on Ethiopian targets around the Somalia-Ethiopia border have been reported.

b) Recently, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has engaged in a more assertive foreign policy with Somalia. The Prime Minister made his first visit to Mogadishu since Ethiopian troops helped to oust the Islamists from Mogadishu in early 2007. He held talks with clan elders whose militia opposed Ethiopian troops there. The Ethiopian Embassy re-opened in Mogadishu after a break of 30 years and Ethiopian troops have been in Somalia for over a year. Although Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has pledged to withdraw his troops from Somalia following peace talks in Mogadishu, he is unlikely to do this yet as the situation remains volatile and too precarious for a pullout of his troops without adequate replacement.

c) The Eritrea-Ethiopia demarcation dispute has stretched over decades into 2008, and tensions should be expected to remain present for some time. The UN mission UNMEE
has recently been reduced by more than a third, which is likely to render the mission less efficient and more vulnerable.

d) Suspected Islamic fundamentalists have used explosives to destroy buildings and kill civilians in East Africa and there is a distinct risk of further attacks in Ethiopia. Small bombs have been detonated in the capital throughout 2007, a trend that considering religious and ethnic tensions, is more likely to continue than not. The latest intelligence in June 08 suggests that, having been ejected from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda is now focusing all its efforts in establishing an infrastructure in Pakistan, Algeria and Somalia. Such a development in Somalia is of direct relevance to the UK. A large number of radicalized Somalis are living in Britain and the latest intelligence indicates that instead of going to Pakistan for Jihad training, they are traveling to Somalia. The Ethiopian border with Somalia is arguably also the UK’s frontline against al-Qaeda. It makes sense for the UK to help to protect that border thereby contributing to continued stability in Ethiopia.

e) Since Ethiopia and Eritrea have not yet agreed the demarcation of their border, the buffer zone remains volatile. Militant activity continues in and around the UN buffer zone in the border region between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In addition to tensions within the Ethiopian/Eritrean border area, the lack of a final resolution over the border has boosted tensions that are being played out in a proxy war in neighbouring Somalia and insurgent attacks in Ethiopia. The deployment of the African Union’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in March 2007 began to provide security in Mogadishu to allow for the quick withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. Although the relationship between Ethiopia and residents in Somalia has been hostile, the troops play a central role in keeping the Somali Government intact. It is likely that if Ethiopia withdraws now, the situation will remain unstable as the Interim Government will be under pressure.

f) The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia has resulted in heightened tensions on the Ethiopia/Somali border area in the Ogaden region. There is a large Muslim population in the area and many are of Somali ethnicity, sympathetic to the former Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and critical of Ethiopia's foreign policy. A number of secessionist organizations such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) have also operated in the area since the mid-1990s; the ONLF and government forces have clashed around Harari and in the Somali regional state, particularly in the Ogaden region.

g) In southern Ethiopia along the Kenyan border, banditry and incidents involving ethnic conflicts are also common. Ethiopian security forces do not have a widespread presence in those regions. Along the border with Kenya, cross-border banditry related to the drought in the region has increased. Armed groups hostile to the Government of Ethiopia operate in several areas near the border with Kenya.

h) Their border with Sudan also remains unstable as civil unrest in eastern Sudan has hampered efforts to demarcate the boundary with Ethiopia. There is a risk of local conflicts between rebels and government forces and between groups of different ethnicities in the area. Secessionist organizations also operate in the areas on the border with Sudan, particularly in the Gambella region.

i) The main separatist groups that operate in Ethiopia are The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which springs from Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group in the east while the other group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), is made up mostly of people of Somali origin fighting for a separate state from Ethiopia. The OLF is believed to be behind a spate of
bomb attacks on fuel transportation trucks leaving Djibouti for Addis Ababa and it has also targeted civilian transport in the past. The Government has accused the OLF, in conjunction with the Eritrean People's Liberation front (EPLF), as sparking ethnic clashes in Gambella. al Qaeda has identified the Horn of Africa as an area of strategic importance between the East and West.

j) The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) fights for self-determination for the Somali-dominated Ogaden province of Ethiopia, and it is part of a larger movement calling for the establishment of a Greater Somalia.

k) In summary, Ethiopia is surrounded by instability. However, the Government has made it abundantly clear that it intends to be a centre of stability in the Region. And, by most measures, it is. The Western Alliance needs to recognise a good thing when they see it. If they don't, they could risk ‘missing the boat’, and Ethiopia could sink into the same instability as the rest of the Horn of Africa.

15. **International Interface with Ethiopia**

   a) In the author’s short visit to Ethiopia, the British Embassy and DFID outlined the broad scope of the programmes of aid in which the US, the EU nations and others are also involved. The author was given a copy of the Baseline System Reform Programme in Ethiopia which revealed broad spectrum of programmes DFID is involved in.

   b) However the one sector, on which arguably everything else is predicated, is the Security Sector Reform Programme. It is the one that Britain and other Nations have decided, to date, not to take forward. In 2004, a proposal for a broad security reform programme was refused. In late 2005, after the Addis Ababa disturbances, it was again refused.

   c) A chink of light has recently appeared. A survey of attitudes towards the Security Forces which is to take place in late 2008 has been approved. It is evident but by no means automatic that a large programme will follow from this survey, whatever its findings. It is hoped that this Report may encourage this process.

16. **Ethiopian Government Programmes**

   a) It is not within the scope of this paper to go into any detail about the extent of the Ethiopian Government plans for economic development. The author of this Report has researched in some detail the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP). This is extraordinarily comprehensive and ambitious. It covers the following sections:

   - Agriculture
   - Education
   - Health
   - HIV/Aids
   - Infrastructure
   - Tourism
   - Mining
   - Trade and Industry development
   - Urban development
   - Regional development and urban-rural linkages
   - Population and development
• Gender and development
• Addressing the particular needs of children
• Governance, capacity-building and decentralisation
• Pastoralists livelihoods and development
• Youth and employment

b) Extraordinarily, there is little mention of Security in general or of the Federal Police in particular. There is a brief mention of both under para 7.14 Governance, Capacity Building and Organization and under para 7.14.3 in particular of the Justice System Reform Programme. This states that "the effectiveness and efficiency of the law enforcement institutions (the public prosecution service, the police, and the penitentiary system) will be enhanced by increasing their capacities in general and by reorganising them...."

c) Despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm about the security infrastructure among Western governments, the Ethiopian Federal Police have emerged in 2008 as a very different organization that existed in 2005. (see section 5 below).

17. The Human Rights Context

a) It is impossible to consider any aspect of Security today without putting it in the context of Human Rights in Ethiopia. The author has read "The Strategic Plan for the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 2006 - 2011" (published in April 2006). It is both extraordinarily ambitious and encouragingly realistic. Having spent several days talking to young federal policemen from all over Ethiopia, the author was struck by the enormity of the problem of enforcing a uniform pattern of behaviour towards the public on young men from 80 different nationalities. This was borne out throughout the Strategic Plan but the extract below stands out:

"Para 6: Summary of Key National Human Rights Needs

Both democracy and human rights are relatively new concepts in Ethiopian Government policy. Much work still needs to be done to acquaint both public servants and citizens with the whole range of human rights as framed in international covenants and conventions and guaranteed in the Country's Constitution.

When one gains a full understanding of the profound cultural and religious diversity of the country and juxtaposes the relatively recent concept of international human rights norms set against the background of a complex mosaic of age-old customs and patterns of coexistence among some eighty different geographically ethnically diverse national groups speaking some two hundred languages, one appreciates the enormity of the challenge of the promotion and protection of human rights that the Government is charged with in this setting."

b) The problem is of course immense and anyone who has lived for any period of time in a developing country will not be surprised by the immensity of the challenge, nor will they expect easy or instant answers - except apparently Amnesty International.

c) The latest report of Amnesty International (AI) ‘Routinely Targeted - Attacks on Civilians in Somalia, May 6, 2008’, makes little or no effort to take account of the realities of the Somali situation or of the fact that Somalia is currently engaged in a counter-terrorist struggle. There is indeed a humanitarian crisis in Somalia. This is not, however, "largely the result of human rights abuses" as AI alleges, nor are these largely the responsibility of
Ethiopian troops. It is not intended to argue the case against AI allegations in this paper. This is succinctly and convincingly achieved in the Horn Update 9.5.08 attached at Annex B. However, there are a number of important conclusions which can be derived from Human Rights issues:

- Much laudable effort is being put into Human Rights programmes in Ethiopia, but unless Human Rights basics are sorted out, the whole security edifice could ‘come tumbling down’. There is an inextricable linkage between the justice system, detention rules, police procedures, prison conditions and international humanitarian laws. The international community demands, whether the Ethiopian government likes it or not, certain basic standards as a price for aid.

- The AI lobby needs to be countered with a PR campaign that emphasises progress in the Human Right area and underlines positive change. The Western press tends unthinkingly to take AI at its word.

- It will inevitably take time to establish much of a Human Rights programme in Ethiopia. There will be setbacks but no progress will be made without firm commitment from the West, moral support and practical aid from the West. It is no good hesitating next time there is a human rights setback which there surely will be. One then gets into the catch-22 situation again.

- There is a need for all the Security Forces to work to the same standard of human rights. For instance, in Addis Ababa, the military guard Government establishments. When forced to open fire, they need to use the same Rules of Engagement as the Federal Police The Foreign press will not differentiate if innocent bystanders are shot by the Army, however excellent the standards of fire discipline may be in the Federal Police.

**Section 5: Organization of the Federal Police**

18. The main operational functions of the Federal Police are:

- Combating serious and organized crime including drug trafficking and terrorism and the protection of vital institutions and infrastructure
- VIP protection
- Border protection
- Provision of an Emergency Response Force
19. The Organization that has been created to achieve these functions is as follows:

```
Comissione

Crime Prevention Department

- Infrastructure Protection
  - Railway Protection
  - Mine Protection
  - Enterprise Protection
  - Border Security

- Operational Preparedness
  - Anti-Terrorism
  - VIP Protection
    - Airports
    - Drug Department
    - Riot Control

- Federal Rapid Force
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20. The Riot Control Department is organised as follows:

Riot Control Department

1st Riot Control Division

2nd Riot Control Division

3rd Riot Control Division

4th Riot Control Division

5th Riot Control Division

Support Division

Information and Intelligence Division

Training and Appointment Division

Note that each Riot Division has three battalions with each battalion having about 400 men. Total Riot Police strength approx. 6000.

21. The author visited one of the Riot Control Divisions. An analysis of its organizational, training, equipment, drills etc is in Section 7 below but it is logical to look at the training system first.

Section 6: The Training System

22. The Police College

a) The author visited the Police College outside Addis Ababa and was shown all the facilities there. It is a well run and impressive facility that can currently accommodate 1200 students. Additional accommodation is building now which will increase capacity to 200. Insofar as the author could tell, the courses are well balanced and well taught. Departments include Law, Crime Prevention, Crime Investigation, PE and Traffic. The one year course includes 51 hours in the syllabus in riot control. The College teaches to Diploma level.

b) The author was impressed by the dedication of staff, the serious manner in which the students appeared to view their studies and by the discipline (smart uniforms, saluting of officers etc). I think it is important to note that this is an establishment where learning is taken seriously. All the students I spoke to were ambitious and keen to improve themselves. If the UK were to provide any training assistance, it would be a pre-requisite that a centre of excellence such as the Police College exists. It is there and it is impressive.

c) It could, of course, be made better and the Commandant provided me with a very reasonable wish list. It included:

- An indoor shooting range: I would agree that for police work with firearms, particularly handguns, an indoor range provides a much better facility with much more realistic targets, including moving targets projected onto a screen, simulating an urban situation much more easily.
• Computers: the lack of computers was painfully obvious. There were none in the classrooms and only one in the library. There is a desperate need for more computers, particularly in some of the central facilities such as the library.

• More Vehicles: They have some Landrovers but find them so expensive to maintain that they are ‘off the road’ much of the time. They desperately need some buses to get police students into Addis Ababa, during their time off, to see their families.

• More classrooms.
• An indoor gymnasium.
• Additional accommodation: this appears to be in the process of building now.
• Overhead projectors and photocopiers.

d) Relatively small sums of money are needed (leaving aside classrooms and accommodation) to improve standards of training at the Police College. The author is not sufficiently well briefed to be able to judge what monies can be used for what. DFID briefed me that under PSCAP there are six sectors, of which justice systems is one, and that very large sums are available under this programme, of which DFID provided £25m. Minister Tefera seemed to think he could not use this money for the security sector, but DFID seemed to think he could. It seems the British Embassy needs to talk to Minister Tefera on this issue.

23. **Police Recruit Basic Training Centre**

• In my brief visit to this Establishment, it was quite difficult to judge standards. The Commandant was not available, no training was in progress, classrooms were empty and the gate was not manned. Facilities were extremely basic. It appeared to me that a large investment in infrastructure and systems was required. I would advise that, if further aid and/or training assistance is forthcoming from the UK, efforts are made to ensure that the needs of the training system are met. After all, it is the training system that makes the policeman.

• The author noted that Riot Police appeared to be trained as riot police only so that most of their time is spent waiting for riots to happen. This is not the most efficient use of resources nor is it good for morale. Precisely why there has to be a separate Rapid Force is not entirely clear as presumably, elements of Riot Control Divisions/Battalions could be ‘double-hatted’ by giving them other additional responsibilities.

**Section 7: Federal Police Riot Control Capability**

24 **Riot Control Drills and Tactics**

The author visited one of the Riot Control battalions and was given a very impressive demonstration lasting some three hours. Various scenarios were played out with some very energetic rioters (provided by the Federal Police). No doubt they had been rehearsing for some time but they put on a very competent demonstration using 3 x platoons of Federal Police to meet different threats. In a word, it was apparent that they have learned well from their South African police colleagues who retrained the Federal Police in riot control procedures after the
2005 debacle. South African police methods are based entirely on inherited British military/police riot control procedures. There is absolutely nothing wrong in the drills they have learned from the South Africans. Any Metropolitan Police team working with the Federal Police in the future would have no problem with the basic drills of the Ethiopians.

25. **Equipment**

**Personal Equipment**

I asked various policemen if they had received any injuries in the 2005 riots and I was shown scars and regaled with stories of injuries. No doubt they were exaggerated for my benefit, but the scars were real, whatever their cause.

Personal equipment had been bought from the South Koreans since 2005. Every riot control policeman is now issued with a perfectly acceptable set of personal equipment which includes:

- Blue uniform
- Helmet, including neck protection, and visor
- Boots
- Protective leggings
- Baton
- Shield

This is the basic equipment required to protect federal policemen from missiles thrown by rioters. The basic equipment they now have is perfectly adequate and should remain so for some years. There are two models of shields, one of which they complained about and they had a point. It was too small and afforded insufficient protection.

26. **Platoon Equipment**

Each Riot Platoon is issued with additional equipment:

- A limited number of gas masks for about 4/5 members of the platoon who are the gas grenade projector team
- A gas grenade projector
- A rubber bullet projector

The glaring inadequacy at platoon level is the lack of gas masks for the entire platoon. It is absolutely nonsensical for 4/5 members of the platoon to be so equipped when the majority of the platoon are susceptible to the gas, which may well mean they are unable to continue to operate in a gas environment. In addition there appeared to be no radio communication at platoon level. Also there were no cameras (for the purposes of the collection of evidence) at platoon level. If a platoon is operating independently it needs its own camera(s).

27. **Battalion Equipment**

A demonstration was put on for me using one of the battalion water-canon trucks. This was deployed effectively to douse some burning tyres and used in conjunction with a platoon of riot police. One wonders how effective water canon is in the extreme heat of Ethiopia, where the cooling-off effect from a drenching might be quite popular! A video camera and still-camera were also deployed at battalion level but there needs to be evidence collection at a lower level.
28. **Equipment Summary**

Equipment was adequate. The one glaring inadequacy was the lack of gas masks for all riot control policemen. The few that did exist were of an inferior quality. High quality masks such as those manufactured by Scott (US) or Avon (UK) are required. Effective crowd dispersal will often depend on the use of gas and, unless every policeman is able to operate in a gas environment, you might as well not bother. Also the ability to deploy and control platoons using radio from battalion HQ seemed non-existent. The interface between riot control and the employment of lethal force also seems unclear. When there is the possibility of coming under rifle fire, there must be the capability within the platoon to return fire. One option is to have 2–4 policemen at the rear of the platoon clearly armed with rifles. This acts as a deterrent but the Kalashnikov is not a suitable weapon for this purpose. It is normally fired ‘on automatic’ and is not designed for single aimed shots. There is a need for a semi-automatic rifle such as the Belgian FN or US Police carbine.

29. **Human Resources**

- The author made a point of talking to as many policemen as possible at all levels, and was impressed. They were strong, fit young men and they seemed well disciplined. They come from all over Ethiopia and herein lies the problem. These young men come from 80 different ethnic groups. They speak different languages, but all have to operate using Amharic. They have different religions (Coptic Christian, Muslim, Anamist etc) and they come from different tribal traditions. The imposition of high standards of discipline and behavior in these circumstances is not easy. However, compared to training standards in 2005, enormous advances have been made. With better equipment and some embedded Metropolitan Police trainers to enhance standards still further, the Ethiopian Federal Police riot control battalions would be well placed to be on a par with South African standards.

- The Director General of the Federal Police, with whom I had three hours of one to one conversation said that he “regretted a lot”, the bad publicity generated in 2005. He had wished very much for a better outcome. As a direct result of the 2005 riots, he sacked 237 policemen. My reading of these discussions was that major efforts had been made to improve the modus operandi and the quality of police personnel. There was a genuine will to take major steps forward and, from what the author saw, the Commissioner has made dramatic progress. For the future, the way the Police behave towards rioters and others, needs further consideration.

30. **Accommodation**

Accommodation standards for the Federal Police in Addis Ababa are quite appalling. The battalion barracks which I visited were situated in some disused railway sidings. The men lived in tin sheds that were previously once used to house locomotives. They are large and cavernous sheds with leaking roofs and concrete floors. The men sleep on bunk beds and have nowhere to keep or maintain their uniforms and equipment. The only taps for washing are outside and there is no lighting. The conditions are utterly basic and cannot be conducive for good morale. Funds are desperately needed to create simple, adequate living conditions.

### Section 8: Detention Practice and Facilities

I insisted on visiting the Federal Police prison but this was too difficult so instead, I was taken to an Addis Ababa sector police station and shown the detention facilities there. I asked to go into the compound where the prisoners are kept. This consisted of a long yard with a shed to one
side which provided some sort of shelter. The compound had a wall around it and a watchtower for an armed sentry overlooking it. Inside must have been 70 – 80 inmates, all in a filthy state. There was insufficient room for all these people to lie down on a mat at once. There was no lighting. The place stank of faeces and urine. There appeared to be no water or sanitation facilities within the compound. There was a small hut in an adjacent compound for women prisoners but there had been no attempt by anybody to improve the circumstances of the place. The prisoners were mostly on remand for minor crimes, in particular theft. Some had been there for months. There was one young boy among the prisoners, who appeared to me to be 12 or 13 years of age, who was weeping and pleading to speak to me so I asked him how old he was. He said 13. He certainly could not possibly have been older than 15. When I asked what the minimum age for holding prisoners in this facility was, one policeman said 18, another 15. In any event, he stayed there.

32. Quite clearly, the Ethiopian authorities have a problem. There is no way these detainees can conjure up bail because they have no money. They have no identity documents and so they cannot prove their identity. They have no fixed abode so they cannot locate themselves. The justice system does not have the capacity to get these people into the Courts quickly. The result of all these circumstances is chaos, injustice for the detainees and condemnation by the human rights lobby and the international community.

33. The situation regarding detention has to be gripped. From my limited exposure to the system I would recommend:

- That some energy is injected into the Justice System so that cases are dealt with more expeditiously.

- That the Police, instead of just living with existing circumstances, take the initiative to improve the living conditions of detainees. This does not require money. It requires police station staff to make an effort (using prisoner labour) to improve the living conditions of detainees. I detected a pervasive lethargy.

- That detainees are processed more carefully so that young boys are not mixed with adult prisoners.

- That some form of punitive labour regime is developed so that offenders can pay back something to Society before they are released after (say) seven days of detention. If the courts have insufficient capacity to deal with them, then they should be released. At least they will have been seen to have paid some sort of penalty.

- Above all, that the capacity of the Courts is increased to deal with these people within (say) seven days.

Section 9: Counter-Terrorism Capability

34. There have been a number of terrorist attacks in either border areas or in Addis Ababa over the past three years. There have been 20 – 25 bomb attacks in Addis Ababa. The police record in preventing these attacks and discovering explosive materials seems to have been good.

35. It was not part of my brief to consider this aspect of the Federal Police’s responsibilities, but the line between riot control/disturbances in the Capital, border control and terrorism is so slim that it is impractical to ignore terrorism.
36. The important thing to understand in this context is the progression from civil disturbance to terrorism and the clear dividing lines dictating responses. The response to terrorism is different to that to civil disturbance. This, if you like, is the ultimate test for the Ethiopian Federal Police, in particular as far as the Human Rights lobby is concerned. From the evidence that I saw, these dividing lines are clearly understood by the Federal Police.

37. What I did not see, and I do not believe exists, is what the British Army in Northern Ireland called “The Yellow Card”. This was a small yellow card carried by all police and military which very clearly lays down the Rules of Engagement i.e. the rules governing when and where it is legally permissible to use lethal force to protect either one’s own life or the life of a member of the general public. Police or military should only ever be allowed to open fire with live ammunition in the following circumstances:

(a) to prevent loss of life; and
(b) to kill the target they are shooting at.

Live ammunition should never be used to fire warning shots. It is the ultimate deterrent and should only be used when there is no other option. The Federal Police need expert advice in drawing up their own version of “The Yellow Card” and training of all policemen as to its meaning and application.

Section 10: Police Budget Issues

38. The Police Budget for FY 2007 – 08 (July – June) is as follows:
   a) Crime Prevention Main Department (Riot Control, Anti-Terrorism Rapid Force):
      239,670,663.00 birr.
   b) Crime and Forensic Investigation Main Department:
      14,677,900 birr.
   c) Support Service Main Department:
      74,334,423 birr.
   d) Ethiopian Police University College:
      15,516,200 birr.
   e) Capital Budget (for construction):
      35,729,500 birr.

39. These figures are included for the benefit of DFID.

40. The PSCAP programme has six sectors of which Justice Systems Reform is one. This programme is valued in hundreds of millions, of which DFID contributes £25m. I was informed by DFID that a substantial security sector infrastructure programme was on hold awaiting Ethiopian Government approval of a study of Citizen’s perceptions of the Security Forces. Why do we have to wait for this? Could it not be expedited?

41. DFID also briefed me that there was no reason why Minister Tefera should not use part of their £25m grant for ‘police assistance’. Minister Tefera, on the other hand, was under the impression he cannot. There is clearly a need for some clarity here.

42. The author was also briefed that there was a DFID bilateral £5m technical assistance programme and that there was no reason why the Police should not be included in this.
DFID are also mystified at the lack of response from the Ministry of Justice to their Baseline Study Report. Although my knowledge of this area is no more than superficial, it is very clear that there is a lack of communication and understanding between the Parties in this area.

It may be that sufficient funds are already available. Whether this is the case or not, the Federal Police are very clear about their main need from the United Kingdom; their tradition, ethos, working methods and hierarchy are based on British Police methods. This is the direction they are determined to follow. They have looked at US and French alternatives but their sincere wish is to rekindle their relationship with the British Police, in particular the Metropolitan Police. More than assistance in kind, they require a Police Training Team. Whether this is made up of serving British Policemen or retired experts is probably not important, as long as they are experts. This need not even be a large team. However, it should be self-sufficient, be independently located, possibly in the Embassy Compound with offices in Federal Police HQ in Addis Ababa. It would be desirable to have their presence at the Police College as well. In particular, it should be expert in Riot Control, Counter-Terrorism and Management of Detention Facilities.

Section 11: Executive Summary

Western governments, and arguably the Ethiopian Government as well, are not giving security issues the prominence and attention it deserves. A strong, well-trained and well-equipped federal police service is fundamental to the future stability of Ethiopia (paras 15-16).

Despite great advances recently in this area (para 17), there remains a continuing vital imperative to inculcate the Federal Police with Human Rights values and a uniform pattern of behaviour towards its public.

The organisation of the Federal Police is satisfactory (paras 18-21).

The organisation and standards at the Police College are impressive. Financial aid is required to meet certain of its needs (para 22).

The Police Recruit Basic Training establishment is indeed basic in every sense. It is in dire need of investment. Adequate training establishments are fundamental to good practice (para 22).

Riot battalion personnel need to be ‘double-hatted’. At present they spend most of their time waiting for riots to happen. This is not efficient use of resources (para 22).

Riot drills and tactics are of a high standard (para 24).
53. Personal equipment for the Riot Battalions are adequate except for the glaring omission of gas masks for every man in a Riot Platoon. This is a major problem as, at present, platoons cannot use tear gas without making themselves non-operational! (para 25).

54. Radio equipment is needed at platoon level for command and control purposes (para 26).

55. Better command and control arrangements are required at battalion and divisional level to ensure proper control of deployed units (paras 27-28).

56. The present interface arrangements between riot control and the use of lethal force are unclear i.e. there is no provision for armed police in a riot platoon (para 28).

57. Further work is required on training Federal Police in the application of acceptable Human Rights standards to police drills and tactics (para 29).

58. Police accommodation is totally inadequate (para 30).

59. Detention conditions of prisoners are a disgrace and make the Federal Police vulnerable to the Human Rights lobby (paras 31-33).

60. The Federal Police have had success against terrorist attempts. However, the interface between the escalation from riots to terrorism is unclear. Clear Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the use of lethal force need to be drafted (paras 34-37).

61. There is a worrying lack of clarity between Western Embassies in Addis and the Ethiopian Government as to what funds can or cannot be used for broadly defined security purposes (paras 40-43).

62. There is a deep wish amongst the Federal Police to rekindle their historic relationship with the Met Police and to receive a Metropolitan Police Training Team (para 44).

Section 12: Recommendations

63. Organizational

- The Federal Police of Ethiopia are well organized. The organization set out in Section 5 need not be drastically changed. The important advance is that the total numbers of Riot Control Police would appear to be adequate to meet any potential threat. They are currently three times the size they were in 2005.

- However the command and control of the Divisions/Battalions/Platoons appears to be inadequate. The author was shown no mobile or static HQ organization to manage the riot control force when deployed e.g. an Operations Centre (static) or Mobile Command Unit (such as employed by the Metropolitan Police). There was a notable lack of radio equipment.

- Whilst the basic organization of the Federal Police Riot Control Divisions appears sensible the means of ensuring it works efficiently when deployed needs further study.

- The author recommends that a detailed study of the Command and Control capabilities of the Federal Police is undertaken either as part of follow-on work or as part of any Metropolitan Police initial investigations/advice.
64. **The Training System**

- Any police force is only as good as its training system. The Federal Police have made some dramatic advances in this field. Not only have they used the expertise of the South African Police, but they have themselves set up an excellent Police College.

- It is recommended very strongly that a detailed study is undertaken of the needs of The Police College. Any investment in the infrastructure of this establishment would be money well spent. I cannot emphasise enough how impressed I was by what has been achieved to date. The Police College is something of which the Federal Police should be immensely proud. Unlike the appalling accommodation for Riot Control battalions, the accommodation at the Police College was perfectly adequate.

- It is recommended that the ‘wish list’ of the Police College Commandant (para 22c) is considered for funding. A Police College that trains high quality police officers and NCOs will pay tremendous dividends in terms of police performance, standards and morale. In particular it will impact on the standards of Human Rights sought from Ethiopia by the wider world.

- Basic Recruit Training also appears to be in need of investment. My visit to the basic training facility was fairly inconclusive, but I would recommend support and advice is also required here, in particular regarding training facilities and infrastructure.

- Riot Control Police must be multi-tasked. The focus on riot control alone is not an efficient use of resources nor is it conducive to good morale.

65. **Riot Control Capability**

- Personal equipment is adequate with the glaring exception of gas masks for all. THE RIOT POLICE WILL BE INEFFECTIVE UNLESS THIS CAPABILITY GAP IS ADDRESSED INSTANTLY.

- Platoon level equipment is adequate except there appears to be a lack of radio communications. This is essential for Command and Control purposes. There also needs to be an evidence collection capability at platoon level. There is a need for a static and/or mobile operations centre.

- The drills and operating procedures of the riot control platoons were, via the South African police, along British lines and was perfectly satisfactory.

66. **Detention**

- Detention facilities and procedures are totally inadequate. The prison I saw was a disgrace. No one is recommending a Hilton Hotel, but, if any human rights organization were to get inside an Ethiopian jail, they would have enough ammunition to sink all our best efforts.

- While strictly speaking outside my brief, I would suggest that some method of shortening detention without trial time limits for petty theft and other minor crime needs to be found. Current guidelines seem to be ignored and the system appears to have seized up.
• It is recommended that the Government should investigate this situation with the intention of improving the current appalling conditions inside Ethiopian prisons, which must brutalise prisoners and their goalers equally.

• It is recommended that senior Ethiopian Ministers and Police Officers visit the prison that I visited.

67. **Counter-Terrorism**

• Considering the level of threat from all around Ethiopia, in particular from Somalia, measures taken to defeat Terrorism seem to have been effective. Most of the bomb plots aimed at Addis Ababa appear to have been frustrated or to have had little effect. However al-Qaeda will continue to pose a severe threat. It is in the UK’s interest to help counter this threat.

• However, the interface between Riot Control and Terrorism appears to be unclear. There seems to be no procedures to manage the escalation from civil disturbance to terrorism. Often the boundaries between the two are unclear.

• Clear Rules of Engagement (ROE) need to be developed. Such ROE need to be constructed within the Rule of Law and with due consideration of Human Rights requirements. It is recommended that as a priority, these ROE are drafted as soon as possible. This is a crucial document which would demonstrate that the Federal Police are operating with Human Rights in mind. This task can be undertaken as part of the follow-on phase of this enquiry.

68. **The Human Rights Overlay**

As Annex B to this paper so graphically demonstrates, it will probably never be possible to satisfy Amnesty International. However, pragmatically, much can be achieved by improving immediately the following:

• Detention conditions.

• Basic training facilities for Federal Police recruits and Police College to ensure the highest possible standards amongst both recruits and graduates of the college.

• A clear ‘Rules of Engagement’ document is developed and made standard throughout the military and the police forces.

• Making greater use of the Justice Ombudsman’s Office to oversee all of the above.

• Initiating a PR campaign to counter the lobby propaganda of human rights agencies.

**Section 13: Final Comments**

69. The author of this paper is a realist. He has spent a large part of his life in developing nations in SE Asia, Africa and the Middle East. He does not believe that he is being unduly optimistic in believing that Ethiopia in general and the security function in particular, are sensible investments. Relatively speaking, Ethiopia is a centre of stability in the Horn of Africa. Since 2005, the security sector there, in terms of training, capability and organization is vastly improved and therefore a sensible investment.
70. The circular argument which the author heard that because of previous alleged misdemeanours by the Federal Police, it is not safe or wise for the UK Government to get involved in future security initiatives is a counsel of despair. The argument does not take into account changed geo-political circumstances, a much larger, better equipped and better trained Federal Police Force and in particular, the UK’s greater interest in maintaining stability and security in the Horn of Africa.

71. It seems we have a moment in time. There is no further excuse for prevarication. Although the risk of further misdemeanours by the Federal Police is minimal and certainly much reduced since 2005, investment and Training Aid can only reduce the risk still further.

72. What is needed by the Federal Police in Addis Ababa, is the advice of a Metropolitan Police Training Team. Unless this is done as soon as possible, the Federal Police will be forced to look elsewhere, which they do not want to do.

73. In the short term, it is suggested that the FCO give the author permission to liaise with the Metropolitan Police so that a more refined idea as to what is needed/what is possible can be developed.

74. But above all, something does need to be done. The time for finding reasons for delay is past. It is in the UK’s clear interest to grasp this nettle.
Michael Dewar  
Curriculum Vitae

Education
1972-1973 Army Staff College, Camberley  
1971-1972 Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, Division 2, Graduate  
1960-1961 Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst: Senior Under Officer

Career History
1996 - Date Managing Director - ONE (formerly known as MDA), MDA Publishing Ltd and Airtime Communications.  
- ONE is a Central London full service communications agency employing 12 people in public relations, marketing, publishing and design. ONE has increased its fee revenue threefold in three years. Clients include: Fujitsu Services, Services Sound and Vision Corporation (SSVC), King Edward VII Hospital Sister Agnes, Travelex, United Grand Lodge of England, BLESMA, British Christmas Tree Growers Association, Supacat Ltd, Memorial Awareness Bard, Cemetery of the Year Awards, Royal Masonic Benevolent Institution, Cintec International Plc, Cerco Training Ltd, Towergate Wilsons, Speakerbus Plc, Combat Stress, Diabetes UK, Victory Services Club, Royal United Services Institute and United World Colleges.  

1994-1997 Director - The Paternoster Partnership  
- The Paternoster Partnership was a city-based financial PR company.  
- Ran a number of prestigious accounts including Heath Consulting, Allied Dunbar plc, Hope and Homes for Children and the Memorial Awareness Board.

Non-Executive Director - Bates Dorland

1990-1994 Deputy Director - International Institute for Strategic Studies  
- The Institute was founded in 1958 as an independent centre for research, information and debate on the problems of conflict.  
- Frequently invited by national and foreign TV and radio stations to comment on international relations topics.  
- Gave presentations and lectures at international conferences and seminars.  
- Co-ordinator of the £500k publishing budget, including the redesign and repackaging of the IISS publications, leading to a 15% increase in revenue.  
- Increased individual and corporate membership by 20% across 90 countries.  
- Guided the 13 short-term contract research staff towards the production of their 30,000 word monographs and contributed towards the identification of future projects.

1960-1990 Army (To 1987 - The Royal Green Jackets: Final rank - Colonel)  
Colonel, Defence Studies, Army Staff College, Camberley  
Reporting to the Chief of General Staff. Was responsible for formulating the army’s strategic thinking.
- Developed a network of contacts with the International Affairs Departments in UK universities, global think tanks and plcs.
- Organised the Army’s first two academic conferences at London and Southampton Universities.
- Established the Combat Studies Institute as the centre of strategic thinking.

1985-1987  Commanding Officer - The Light Division Depot, Winchester
The Depot had a military and civilian population of 1,200 and trained 600 soldiers a year. Responsible for a budget of £10m a year.

1981-1984  Chief of Operations - HQ 1st British Corps, Germany
- This post had two roles: planner and manager of the Corps’ Operational HQ.
- Wrote the operational plan to frustrate a Soviet attack.
- Managed the HQ during a test of the plan (Exercise Lionheart) the largest deployment of British troops since 1945.

1962 - 1984  Early Military Career
Standard military career in Cyprus, Malaysia, Singapore, Borneo, Libya, USA, Germany, Northern Ireland and England.

Consultancies held including:
- Sky Broadcasting, BBC World, I
- Marshall Cavendish Publishing
- Japanese delegation to OECD
- Entico Corporation
- Hill Taylor Dickinson
- Herbert Smith Shipping Broker
- European Space Agency
- Sterling Publications

Publications:
Author of 15 books including:

Other positions held:
- British Association of the Knights of Malta
- Advisory Board, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London
- Royal United Services Institution Publications Committee

Michael Dewar Profile
Michael Dewar is an established expert on Public Relations, Marketing, Design and Publishing issues. During his career in the British Army from 1962-1990, he served in Cyprus, Borneo, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, the USA, Germany and Berlin before retiring as a full Colonel. During this period he became well known as an author and expert on military issues having written to date some 15 books.

In 1990 he was appointed Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. During his time there he helped to bring the IISS to a position of increased prominence in the UK, in particular through his regular commentaries on TV and Radio on strategic issues. He also helped to
increase both the individual and corporate membership of the Institute and to establish the relationship with the Oxford University Press for the IISS publishing programme.

Michael became a Director of leading PR, marketing, and design company, The Albermarle Connection in 1994. In this post, he generated considerable new business and ran a range of prestigious accounts including Allied Dunbar and Heath Consulting.

In 1996, he set up MDA Communications: a PR, marketing and design company in London. MDA has a variety of clients in several business sectors. Clients include Fujitsu Services, Services Sound and Vision Corporation (SSVC), King Edward VII Hospital Sister Agnes, Travelex, United Grand Lodge of England, BLESMA, British Christmas Tree Growers Association, Supacat Ltd, Memorial Awareness Bard, Cemetery of the Year Awards, Royal Masonic Benevolent Institution, Cintec International Plc, Cerco Training Ltd, Towergate Williams, Speakerbus Plc, Combat Stress, Diabetes UK, Victory Services Club, Royal United Services Institute and United World Colleges.
In a highly inadequate response to previous criticism, an Amnesty International spokesperson has said AI's latest report (Routinely Targeted -Attacks on Civilians in Somalia, May 6, 2008) should be read carefully. However carefully it is read, however, it can only lead to mounting concern. It is not just that the report repeats claims which are entirely spurious, and which Amnesty must know to be false. There are serious methodological flaws which suggest deliberate bias. There is evidence of highly selective manipulation of facts, which raise considerable concern about AI's agenda.

The report makes little or no effort to take account of the realities of the Somali situation or of the fact that Somalia is currently in the throes of an anti-terrorist struggle. Of course, there is a humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Indeed, the Food and Agricultural Organization suggested this week that 3.5 million people, nearly half of Somalia's population, may need food aid by the end of the year. The drought is becoming steadily more severe in central areas of Bakool and Hiiraan, as well as the coastal areas of Lower Shebelle and parts of Somaliland and Puntland. A government spokesperson in Mogadishu said the government had appealed to aid agencies to redouble their efforts to avert "this unfolding catastrophe". This is not, however, "largely the result of human rights abuses" as AI alleges. Such a claim ignores the fact that a majority of the IDPs in Somalia actually fled from drought, flooding, locust infestations and other natural disasters as well as from the fighting consequent upon the military expansion of the Islamic Courts in 2006.

No one disputes human rights abuses have occurred but the assumption that these are largely the responsibility of Ethiopian troops, as AI appears to suggest, is simply untrue. Amnesty International has finally accepted that there are "armed groups" who perpetrate human rights abuses in Somalia, though it has taken an unconscionably long time to admit this. Its previous failure to acknowledge "armed group" activity has, of course, had a seriously damaging effect. By allowing such groups to assume they were immune from criticism, it encouraged them to continue their violations. Even now, AI still appears to refrain from categorizing Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization or from looking seriously at the mass of evidence available (including Al-Shabaab's own public announcements) of its terrorist activities over several years. AI's report does note that people are reluctant to make claims against "armed groups" for fear of retaliation. It then fails to note the corollary: that fear can persuade people to make false accusations.

Many of the complaints AI has recorded are clearly invented if only because many of the allegations levelled against Ethiopia and Ethiopian troops are culturally impossible, a point about which AI seems to have little or no knowledge. Almost all the complaints to which the report refers appear to be made by people now in exile. Many have a very clear political agenda. In many cases, accusations are being made weeks, months, even years, after the alleged events. They are often entirely vague, all too often based on hearsay and only very seldom including any claim of personal witness. When making allegations of this seriousness, it is simply not acceptable to use such phrases as "many others reported". Virtually none of the supposed incidents mentioned on pages 11, 12 and 13, for example, actually provide even alleged accounts by eyewitnesses. Direct evidence of responsibility is lacking. Al-Shabaab and Ethiopian forces have been in an area, dead bodies are found; Ethiopian troops must be responsible; Amnesty International agrees. In fact, not too many people in Mogadishu would deny that Ethiopian troops are very well-disciplined.
The failure of AI to provide a breakdown of its sources or any evidence of their independent political affiliation makes clear the allegations are often no more than propaganda. A good example of the way this operates is apparent in AI's version of the recent events at Al-Hidaya mosque. Much of its "evidence" obviously came from organizations that AI is fully aware are only masquerading as human rights bodies. There is no doubt that virtually all are linked to elements in Al-Shabaab. The result is that AI has given quite unwarranted credence to a version of events which fails to allow, inter alia, for frequent Al-Shabaab execution of moderate Islamic clerics, common usage by Al-Shabaab of throat slitting as a means of death, and Al-Shabaab's pride in the desecration of dead bodies. All of this should have raised at least some questions in mind of AI researchers. Additionally, almost all of the 200 alleged civilians killed in the clashes that weekend were actually fighters killed in battle in the attack on an Al-Shabaab hide-out. AI appears to be unaware Al-Shabaab fighters do not wear uniforms.

Ethiopia has made it clear on numerous occasions it deplores any and all violations of human rights in Somalia, or anywhere else. It acknowledges that in any conflict situation, and particularly in a situation of urban terrorist action, civilian deaths may occur. It deeply regrets any loss of life in that context. Nevertheless, Ethiopian troops have never knowingly targeted civilians at any time. What has been happening in Mogadishu has been a struggle against a ruthless terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab, which over the last few years has been responsible for random attacks on non-military targets, causing widespread destruction of houses, hotels, shops, schools, restaurants, hospitals and clinics. It has been responsible for the murder of hundreds of civilians and moderate political and religious leaders as part of its campaign to spread fear and opposition to the TFG. It has demonstrated a deliberate and wanton disregard for civilian life in its operations. It has frequently glorified in its "achievements", among which it has publicly included the deaths of women and children, among them twelve women, khat sellers, killed in one mini-bus in a roadside bomb. None of this is in dispute yet AI has made virtually no reference to any of this over the last two or three years. Even if it does now accept that "armed groups" commit atrocities, AI still does not go into any details; it reserves this for claims about Ethiopian troops. In a similar failure, AI makes no mention of Eritrean support for terrorist activities in Somalia. Its concentration on Ethiopia allows it to minimize the activities of Eritrea, a far greater danger to peace in our region, as it is currently demonstrating in Djibouti, and also perhaps the country most responsible for human rights abuse in the Horn of Africa.

AI's latest report precisely underlines that it does not have an open mind about Ethiopia or about human rights in Somalia. It makes no effort to establish the facts before indulging in unrestrained, and frequently, inaccurate criticisms. Ethiopia is very conscious of the need for human rights. This is why, several years ago Ethiopia set up a Human Rights Council and an Ombudsman's Office, which issue regular reports. Has AI seen any of them? This is why, for example, a hundred legal advisers from the National Defence Force were participating in an ICRC workshop on international humanitarian law last month, or nearly two hundred prosecutors and police from Oromia state have been taking part in a Ministry of Justice human rights training program this month. In the last five years some four thousand judicial and police officials have taken part in similar training.

AI consistently ignores all such activities. It appears to assume all allegations against the Government of Ethiopia are automatically true, even though it knows perfectly well many are politically motivated. It makes no effort to investigate the reality of claims, The US Ambassador in Ethiopia recently noted: "there's a lot of misinformation about Ethiopia ...the problem comes in trying to decide what is fact and what's fiction." AI still seems unable to distinguish between fact and fiction, nor, apparently, does it appear to want to do so.
Richard Beard
The Relevance of Intelligence

1. One of the original aims of this project was to emphasise the crucial importance of painstaking gathering of intelligence on both internal and external threats to the Ethiopian State over a long period of time. During my week in Addis, there was neither the time nor the opportunity to talk to intelligence agencies and not surprisingly senior police officers were reluctant to talk in too much detail about intelligence issues. I was briefed in outline on the intelligence services and police links with it. Senior police officers expressed their satisfaction with the intelligence services and cited in particular the timely warning the Federal Police had been given concerning a series of terrorist bomb attacks in Addis Ababa in 2006/7. Consequently it was possible to head off/minimise the effects of most of the attacks.

2. Whilst I am sure that the efforts of the Ethiopian intelligence services are entirely praiseworthy, I can think of no intelligence service I have worked with that would not benefit from an objective audit. Given the fact that countries that have been in the intelligence game for a very long time have not always played their cards as well as they might have done, it is likely that improvements can be made in Ethiopia.

3. Intelligence gathering is a long-term process. The campaign against the IRA only turned in the British Government’s favour after a comprehensive campaign infiltrated the IRA’s ranks. The war against the IRA lasted 30 years. It took up to 15 of those years to build up the intelligence picture so that the war became winnable. Good intelligence proved to be the war-winning factor in counter insurgency operations in Northern Ireland. The Russians, on the other hand, tried short-cuts in their gathering of information in Chechnya with disastrous results. In Vietnam the US never successfully coordinated their intelligence infrastructure with those of their South Vietnamese allies, again with disastrous results.

4. The British Police, in particular the Metropolitan Police, have created a close relationship with MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. To date, with the exception of the July 2005 London underground terrorist attacks, the Police have successfully acted on good intelligence to pre-empt a whole range of terrorist attacks in Britain. Quite clearly most of this work is highly classified but nevertheless, should the Metropolitan Police come to work with the Ethiopian Federal Police in the future, they will be well qualified to advise on intelligence matters on a generic basis.

5. In the meantime, I recommend that during my next visit to Addis, I should be authorised to audit the means and methods of Ethiopian intelligence gathering. I am qualified to do so, having worked closely with both MI5 and MI6 over a number of years. I will then also be in a position to brief the Metropolitan Police accordingly.

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